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THE QABADAYAT IN LEBANON

by



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A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and
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Master of.....Arts.....

ABSTRACT

In this research I have provided information on a distinctive type of organized crime in Lebanon known as the Qabadayat. I arrived at empirical generalizations concerning that form of criminal behavior and its relationship to other institutions, especially the political institution.

The fertile soil for the growth of that form of criminality is social values which are conducive to violence and corruption.

The Qabadayat system performs many functions for the community and this contributes to its survival.

The fact that the Qabadayat are needed by the community in a personalistic society gives them prestige and power over the community.

The politicians step in to make use of that power, and to foster it. The politicians offer protection to the Qabadayat who make very good use of it to secure their private ends.

As long as there are institutionalized illegal channels some people, due to various contributing factors, will use them because they find them easier, faster or more convenient than legal channels.

Institutionalized corruption makes some people feel they have the right to share in it. This confirms the notion that white collar crime encourages crime by the lower classes.

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1. Za'im: in the specifically Lebanese sense is a political leader who possesses the support of a locally circumscribed community and who retains this support by fostering or appearing to foster the interests of as many as possible among his supporters. He usually belongs to an outstanding or notable family. His position of leadership is frequently passed on to some of his descendants. He is not a purely political leader, nor is he simply a successful business operator, instead he combines both functions and tends to mix them intimately.

An emotional value is attached to the title itself, and the za'im is able to command the personal loyalty of his followers. His political or social programs are of no importance or relevance as far as personal loyalty to him is concerned.

Zu'ama: plural of Za'im

Za'ama: noun

2. Wastah: is the individual's intimate relationship with those in power positions, to the extent that they are ready to break any law or rule and do their best to help him and protect him.
3. Qabadayat: is the plural of Qabaday. Qabaday refers to a person who possess the following qualities: physical strength, great courage, good heart, helpful, and a past record of "heroic" deeds. The Qabaday has become a role in Lebanon. It is part of the cultural make-up of Lebanese society. Those persons are very close to politicians because they are election "keys." Leonard Binder describes them thus: "...a great deal of emphasis upon the role of electoral brokers known as Qabada'is. From all descriptions, these

are, more or less common fellows, in close touch with the people, always ready to make a little more money, and not above using strong arm methods. These people are often referred to as the keys to election victory...offering financial rewards may be the best way of winning over Qabadi's..."¹

¹ Leonard Binder, "Political Change in Lebanon," in Leonard Binder (ed.) Politics in Lebanon (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 294.

INTRODUCTION

There exists in Lebanon a certain type of crime which forms a complete closed circuit system. This system is the Qabadayat criminal system whose basic character is violence, but under which all other types of law-breaking activities occur. This criminal system is totally or almost totally furthered, nourished, and preserved by the political system.

My primary aim is the understanding of the Qabadayat system itself. I will try to find out why the system exists in Lebanon, why it persists, how and why new members join the system.

The analysis of the Qabadayat system will remain lacking or incomplete if that system is not seen in the context of the larger social system, and in terms of its relationship to other institutions in society, mainly the political order. Here, I will try to show how the existing social and political conditions create the opportunity for the existence of the Qabadayat system. Both aims could be subsumed under a theoretical explanation of the Qabadayat system.

Chapter One

Lebanese Cultural Background

It is generally accepted that the understanding of any social aspect, any subsystem or any behavior remains incomplete if it is not seen within its larger social context. The understanding of the total system should precede any attempt to comprehend any aspect of that system. For instance, I do not believe that it is possible to understand and explain any form of criminality in a society without sufficient knowledge of the basic structure and basic values of that society. Any social aspect, whether it is crime, family or thought, is a manifestation of the social system.

There are four aspects of the Lebanese society which are a major foundation of that society and which are closely related to the existence of the Qabadayat system. These aspects are:

- a) characteristics of the population
- b) social values
- c) the nature of the political order
- d) characteristics of the civil service and bureaucracy.

Since Lebanon is in a transitional stage, a discussion of the landmarks of change and direction of change in each aspect is necessary.

a) The Characteristics of Population:

Lebanon is a small Arab country with a population of two million, half of whom live in the capital, Beirut. Small as it is, Lebanon does not have a homogenous population, ethnically or religiously. Ethnically it is a mosaic society. It has several minority groups such as Armenians, Assyrians, Kurds, Palestinians, Jews, etc. Religiously, the Lebanese population is almost equally divided into Christians and Muslims. In

addition, each of the two dominant religious groups include several sub-sects with conflicting interests.

Unlike countries such as the U.S.A. and Canada, the Lebanese society in particular and the Arab society in general are not melting pot societies, mainly because of the early Islamic invasion which tolerated minorities and allowed them to keep their ethnic and religious character within the dominant Arab Islamic culture.

Although nationalism has developed in Lebanon, the Lebanese citizen still identifies with his family first, then he moves out to identify with larger social groups. For example, a Lebanese is a Zantout (family name), a Muslim, a Lebanese and an Arab. This identity has roots in the Arab tribal and familial social organization, which started to break down only with the turn of the twentieth century, 1908 and on.

The mosaic structure of the Lebanese society imposes a certain condition on the social reality of Lebanon. Every ethnic and religious group has to look after its own interests; it has to be strong, and it has to fight when necessary to protect its rights and interests. There is hardly any trust among the various groups and sects. This condition creates great social conflict among the various factions of society. Historically, it has led to two major civil wars, one in 1860 and one in 1958.

All the above mentioned factors have led to a unique constitution whereby political power was distributed among the different religious sects on the basis of the number of followers a sect commands. A census was made in 1932. The Maronites (Catholics) composed the larger sect, followed by Sunni Muslims, etc. Positions of power were distributed accordingly: Maronites got the positions of President and Army Commander; Sunnis got those of Prime Minister and Chief of Interior Security, etc.

Also positions in the civil service and bureaucracy were proportionally distributed. The same principle was applied to parliament and the cabinet.

After independence, and with the movement towards a nation state, the status quo created many tensions and frustrations for many groups and individuals, such as political parties and intellectuals.

b) Social Values:

Naturally, I am not going to discuss all Lebanese social values. The values I am going to discuss are those related to the emergence of the Qabadayat system; values which constitute a fertile soil for that type of crime to emerge.

The Lebanese value personal ties and personal loyalties very highly. This fact is very cleverly manipulated by politicians. That is the channel through which politicians gather followers and command the personal loyalty of their men. A Lebanese is ready to do anything to help or protect his friend or relative. Personal loyalty places many obligations on the individual, and thus the Qabadayat feel so indebted to politicians that they are ready to do things, despite their personal preferences, for the politician's sake.

Another important aspect of personal ties is that they create a feeling that one cannot and probably should not try to make it on his own. It is desired for everyone to exchange help, services, and favors with others. This value gives a place in the community to the Qabadayat who are, generally speaking, very obliging in rendering services and who, through their contacts, are in a position of doing favors for community members.

The Lebanese believe that force and violence are the ultimate or, sometimes, the best solution to problems. They carry that belief into

their daily affairs. They often resort to physical force. This is evident in relationship to two traditional types of crime prevalent in Lebanese society: the first is blood feud and the second is honour crime.

Blood feud is a norm. It is the duty of any family member, especially the closest of kin, to take revenge for the murder of his relative on any member of the murderer's family. Then another member of the new victim's family takes revenge on any member of the new murderer's family and so on. It is a chain of assassinations between two or more families. Some examples are: 1) A man murdered another man. He was prosecuted and served a twenty-year sentence. The brother of the victim waited the whole twenty years. The day the man was released, the brother waited for him at the prison's gate and shot him to death. 2) A policeman who was supposed to accompany a murderer to court, heard the man's name when the hearing started. He realized that he was the man who murdered his cousin, so he shot him in the court and killed him.

Honour crime is another norm, whereby every man is expected to kill his female relative (sister, mother, wife, cousin, etc.) if she misbehaves. If he kills her, he would rise in prestige; if he does not every one would spit on him.

Another value of relevance to the present study is that of manliness. It is desired for Lebanese youth to be tough, strong and courageous. This emphasis leads to a considerable amount of violence, as an open expression of manliness.

c) The Political Order:

The Lebanese political order has changed from a feudal order to a dualistic order of feudalism and modern democracy. Lebanon has adopted democratic institutions like parliament, cabinet, army and police, and

bureaucracy. It has also adopted universal principles or processes like election by popular vote, the right of every adult citizen to run for public office, equality before the law, and free competitive campaigning. However, all these modern institutions and principles, oddly enough, are limited by and go hand in hand with confessionalism and feudalism. Large feudal families are still in control of Lebanon's political life. In theory any citizen could reach any public office; however, in reality only members of large feudal families or persons supported by those families can ever get into public offices. The most striking example of that fact is the foreign diplomatic core, which is completely monopolized by feudal families.

Going back as far as four hundred years ago, Lebanon has been and still is dominated by the same ten or so families. Also since independence in 1946, the same old faces continue to dominate the political scene.

The form of feudal domination has changed; it is no longer control by coercion and absolute power, since the Lebanese people are no more peasants working for the feudal families and living on feudal land. The Lebanese population is composed of independent urban workers and independent farmers. Control of the Lebanese masses is now achieved through appeal. The appeal usually takes the form of services offered by politicians, personal liking or money. The fact that leadership depends on appeal creates rivalry among politicians which could be very bitter and in which all means could be utilized.

Lebanese politicians need the votes to remain in office or to gain public office. The people need the help of politicians in their day-to-day affairs and problems in Lebanon's personalistic, particularistic society.

This mutual need between the people and the Zu'ama creates certain relationships whereby the Za'im as a person (whose influence extends to several areas like private business, bureaucracy, civil service, allocation of government funds, etc.) becomes sort of a businessman who builds a permanent or semi-permanent clientele, namely the voters, around himself.

The fact that politicians need to do services for their clientele, have to solve their problems, and look after their interests, leads to wastah, which in many cases violates the laws or the legal rights of other parties. Wastah leads to corruption in most administrative institutions, mainly the judiciary, the civil service, the bureaucracy, and the police department.

In addition, politicians carry on their own illegal activities in order to get back the huge sums they usually invest in campaigns, i.e., buying votes, and paying the Qabadayat. Since they cannot carry on those activities themselves, they turn to some of their clientele to do the job and at the same time promise them protection against legal prosecution.

My brief discussion of the Lebanese political order, whose central figures are the Zu'ama could best be summed up by Arnold Hottinger's words:

. . . But under the special conditions of Lebanon, the feudal relationship had developed into an organic institution whose utility was not exhausted when the military function of the Za'im became obsolete. Buttressed by private property and by administrative office, as he had once been sustained by the delegated feudal authority of the state, the Za'im continues to fulfill social and political functions similar to those of his ancestors. He even retains some of his warrior functions. In times of crisis he is able to lead his community in the field. Above all, he preserves his quality as a spokesman and intermediary between the government and his client group. Thus he serves to channel whatever government favors are available to himself and to his group. For the government he is necessary because his people trust their Za'im,

which makes it possible to reach the people through him and to obtain commitments from the group via his person. For the people, he is also indispensable because they have little direct means of communication with a government viewed by many as alien, if not inimical. The Za'im is also needed as a guarantor of the peace; he is able to treat with the heads of different groups to establish some kind of equilibrium between his community and the outsiders. Finally, the Za'im is needed as a dispenser of favors to his in-group (even though he keeps a substantial margin of the advantages gained by his position as a Za'im to himself). He provides employment for many of his people, directly or indirectly; he is also able to isolate a man from his group through his manifold contacts with fellow Zu'ama and the government, so as to make it very difficult for that man to find employment.¹

d) The Civil Service and Bureaucracy:

The Lebanese civil service and bureaucracy are almost completely corrupt. They are corrupted by politicians through the wastah they extend to their men or supporters. The civil service provides the best area in which the politician can render favors to his clientele.

Politicians, as parliament or cabinet members, can employ their men, regardless of their qualifications, because they are the ones who appoint the high officials of the civil service and they control the promotion of those officials. The tremendous amount of corruption in the civil service and bureaucracy recently led to a famous "scandal,"² in which it was revealed that around 4,000 persons were on the government payroll but didn't work, and thousands of others were unqualified for their jobs. The investigation was initiated by the President, but soon he had to stop it and close the case because he realized that the scandal would expose every single Lebanese politician.

¹ Arnold Hottinger, "Zu'ama in Historical Perspective," in Leonard Binder, Politics in Lebanon, p. 91.

² I am using the term "scandal" because that is how all newspapers referred to the incident, rather than to imply that it was a great shock to many people.

In corrupt bureaucracy not only the politicians can go their way, but their men as well. The Qabadayat are able to get lots of business, legal or illegal, done through the bureaucracy and through government offices, i.e., customs, export-import office, department of transport, department of public works, etc.

Change in Lebanese Cultural Aspects

Change in the structure of the Lebanese social system as a whole, that is the major parts of the system and the way these parts are held together, is hardly occurring. However, change within the different aspects of Lebanese society is occurring at a relatively fast rate. The main factor which is bringing about this change is education. Education helps and encourages individuals to break through traditional barriers, such as confessionalism, family loyalty, and personalistic politics. Although I state that change is going on, we should not be very optimistic about it. In many cases the traditional grip is overcoming educational influence, and completely overshadowing it even among the educated Lebanese.

There is no change in the **ethnic composition** of Lebanese population, and the structuring of that population. The same is true of the Lebanese constitution.

There is very little, if any, melting of the different ethnic and religious groups into a Lebanese identity. Only lip service is paid by Lebanese citizens and leaders to the "Lebanese nation" or to the idea that "we are all brothers; we are all the same." The government, especially the President, is trying to create such an image and such a nation, but it is like writing on sand because no action is taken at the societal base to implement that image.

The same is true of the constitution or the legal reality of the society. Some of those who have succeeded in acquiring a sense of Lebanese and/or of Arab identity call for abolishing the present constitution and writing a new constitution that aims at creating a new social reality. Those who oppose a change in the constitution, at the intellectual level, say that a change in the constitution must follow change in the social structure. On the level of the masses, any change in the constitution will lead to civil war.

The landmark of change in the structure of Lebanese population is the increase, with time, of the number of educated people who go beyond group or sect identity to national identity.

Change in Lebanese social values is more promising. Although personal ties and personal loyalties are still central values, individuals are more and more fed up with the heavy obligations these values place upon them. There is less tolerance among the mobile individuals for the parasitic dependence of others, usually relatives and friends, upon them. These mobile individuals, who are a minority, are hesitant to ask favors from others and they prefer solving their problems through impersonal channels.

On the group level there is a growing disbelief that force and violence are the best solutions for existing problems. That disbelief, which signifies a change in values, became stronger after the civil war in 1958 in which no group could achieve its goals by resorting to force. The motto of Lebanese groups after that civil war was "no winner and no loser."

It is very difficult to assess the change on the individual level in the outlook towards violence, because there is still a large volume of violence even in very "trivial" matters.

Blood feud as a norm has tremendously lost its appeal. This is evidenced by the increasing number of people who resort to law in cases of a relative's murder.

There is no breakdown in the Lebanese extended family. However, social and physical mobility are creating semi-independent nuclear families which are not under the immediate pressure of the extended family. The result is more deviation from the norm of honour crime. The gradual change in the relationship between the sexes is making it impossible for such a norm to function effectively, if at all. I believe that this norm will die when the present form of relationship between the sexes changes radically.

Manliness is still a strong value. A replacement of this value has to be preceded by change in the above mentioned values.

There is no change in the existing political order in Lebanon. From within, there is no tendency to change; on the contrary there is great resistance to any change. The bases for political power have not changed. They are, the family, the clan, the district, and the religious community. Politicians cling strongly to their established ways and they will never give them up voluntarily.

The political order is attacked from without by two forces: socially mobile individuals and political parties. The strength and value of the attack by both forces has remained very insignificant, i.e., no socially mobile individual could break through the system, and no modern political party has had any of its leaders enter top positions in the political hierarchy, not to mention that few deputies belong to or represent any political party.

Ralph E. Crow says, "The only alternative for a change in the Le-

banese political system is the substitution of new bases of power."³

What new bases of power could serve as substitutes, and how could the existing bases of power be supplanted at all? Professor Crow has no answer and many people are pessimistic about such a possibility.

What was said about change in the political system could be said about the civil service and the bureaucracy. Any change in the civil service is dependent upon a change in the political system.

The situation of the civil service has best been described by Labib Zuwiyya-Yamak. As he says:

The civil servants as a group participate actively in the political process and usually act as agents of the various notables and political leaders. Frequently they are the pawns of domestic politics and seem to exist not in order to make administration more efficient, but rather so they can be manipulated by the key figures in the political process. Since their appointment to the service is governed primarily by confessional considerations and only secondarily by merit, their activity within the political system reflects the high degree of political confessionalism in Lebanon.⁴

³ Ralph E. Crow, "Confessionalism, Public Administration and Efficiency," from Leonard Binder, Politics in Lebanon, p. 183.

⁴ Labib Z. Yamak, "Party Politics in the Lebanese Political System," from Leonard Binder, Politics in Lebanon, p. 154.

Chapter Two

The Research Design and Methods

This chapter includes a discussion of the following:

- I. Overview
- II. Design: (a) construction of the questionnaire
(b) the sample
(c) problems
- III. Review of Literature.

I. Overview

In terms of breaking the law in Lebanon, three types of offenders are readily identifiable: (a) the ordinary criminal who breaks the law for his own purposes and reasons;¹ (b) the "white-collar" or "business-man" criminal, who in Lebanon takes on special dimensions due to the opportunities available for illicit trade and commerce on a large scale; and (c) the Qabadayat, which is an amalgam of people with strong political affiliation.

The primary aim of this research is to provide a description of the form of criminal activity referred to as the Qabadayat.

The Qabadayat is a distinctive organized type of deviance, however it shows strong resemblance to "organized crime," "machine politics," "professional crime," and "political crime."²

Organized crime is similar to a business enterprise; it is organized for profit, e.g., gambling, smuggling drugs, etc. The Qabadayat

¹ See Dr. Patricia Richmond's study of this offender group in Lebanon.

² For extended discussion of these types of crime, see Clinnard and Quinney, Criminal Behavior Systems: A Typology, and Gosnell, Machine Politics.

system is not organized to maximize economic profit, however economic profit is definitely a major goal of the Qabadayat but it is not so to politicians.

Machine politics is similar to organized crime but the primary objective is political power, and in many instances perhaps a means to economic profit. Machine politics is very similar to the Qabadayat, especially in mechanisms used and in methods resorted to. However the focus in the Qabadayat system is not on the politicians, but on those who are affiliated with the politicians, e.g., their men.

Professional crime refers to specialization usually in one type of illegal action, e.g., pickpocketing. It is a role and usually it is the criminals only or major means of earning a living. Some of the Qabadayat are professional criminals (some hangers-on) but the majority are not.

Political crime refers to "behaviors or activities which are regarded as apparent threats and dangers to the political state."³ Some examples of political crime are treason, espionage, assassination, violation of military draft regulations, etc. The Qabadayat are not political criminals because they are not a threat to the political state or to the existing social structure. On the contrary, the Qabadayat support the existing social structure and work for it.

II. Design

(a) Construction of the Questionnaire. The questionnaire was constructed by Dr. Richmond and myself. Then it was passed on to three professors who gave helpful remarks which were integrated.

³ Clinkard and Quinney, Criminal Behavior Systems: A Typology, p. 178.

The questionnaire was then pretested and modified. I carried on the interviewing after proper contacts were made with the respondents by two friends of mine who were Qabadayat themselves. The research setting was public cafes, where the Qabadayat spend most of their time. Later we arranged to visit them at their houses.

(b) The Sample. The sample of this research is composed of criminals at large, who are concentrated in the three biggest Lebanese cities --Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon. The sample is composed of 72 criminals: 52 from Beirut, 10 from Tripoli and 10 from Saida. We⁴ interviewed the majority in Beirut, because Beirut has a much larger number of Qabadayat than Tripoli or Saida. The Qabadayat are legal criminals, i.e., they violate the laws.

(c) Problems.

Representativeness of the Sample--Since the number of Qabadayat in Lebanon is not known, and due to the special status and condition of the subjects, it was impossible to get a random sample of these criminals. However, representativeness was obtained in two ways: First, the Qabadayat are found in certain areas of the cities, i.e., in the traditional areas. So we tried to cover as many areas as possible in terms of the selection of respondents. Second, the Qabadayat are affiliated with certain politicians. Every politician has his own men. Since the politicians are known, we interviewed many of the Qabadayat affiliated with the major politicians.

⁴ I was assisted in the interviewing by two friends of mine, who were Qabadayat themselves.

III. Review of Literature

No study of professional criminals outside of jail could be located for purposes of comparison. The studies of professional criminals have been limited to specific criminal roles such as shop-lifting, armed robbery, sex crimes, etc. Very little research has been done at all on crime in Lebanon or in other Arab countries to which I can refer.

I did not find in the existing literature any scientific study of a problem of identical or similar nature to mine. However, I found mention of parallel criminal systems in other countries, for example in the United States. Knowledge about parallel systems in other countries has been obtained through scandals, newspapers, senate investigation committees, and impressionistic descriptions of similar systems based on whatever little public information was available. Some of the parallel literature I reviewed is:

Daniel Bell in his article, "Crime as an American Way of Life," describes how organized crime is used as a route of social ascent in American life. He observed this process among different immigrant groups. Bell points to the relationship between criminals and politicians by saying that the illegally earned wealth of the new immigrants financed the American political machinery. Corruption, in that case, was inevitable. Bell then attributes the decline of that political machinery to the structural change in the form of providing services, mainly the growth of bureaucratically administered structures.

Merton in Social Theory and Social Structure mentions Bell's article, then he explains why the system existed. He says that such a form of crime persists by virtue of the social functions it performs for the various parts of the underlying population who constitute the criminals'

clientele. He specifies five major functions of organized crime:

- 1) It serves political integration in a system of decentralization of power.
- 2) It provides personalized help to disadvantaged people in an impersonalized society.
- 3) It provides a mechanism for social mobility.
- 4) It allows economic groups to achieve their various ends.
- 5) It allows illegitimate business to serve the public without undue interference by the government.

Merton says what breaks up such a form of deviant behavior is the development of legitimate structural alternatives for performing the same functions as the criminals or the rackets had provided.

Another book which deals with a parallel system is Gus Tyler's Organized Crime in America. The book contains a number of articles that deal with "syndicate" crime in America. Lebanon has not reached such a stage. However, the only phenomenon similar to the Lebanese Qabadayat system is the "Fix," or as Tyler calls it the "Big Fix." The fix is a popular word which refers to the quasi-immunity of top level criminals. It is not always the direct payment of money to law-enforcement officials, although sometimes that occurs. The fix comes about through the acquisition of political power by contributing to political organizations, by buying public good will through charitable contributions, and by maintaining good press relations. Tyler defines the "Big Fix" as "the system whereby the outlaw becomes the law. The system operates through political action. The system can only be broken through political action."

There are two articles of relevance to my problem in Clinnard and Quinney's Criminal Behavior Systems. The first is their introduction. They describe the structure of organized crime as a hierarchy of positions of command. At the top of the pyramid are powerful leaders who make the

important decisions and run the organization. A middle echelon of gangsters, henchmen, and lieutenants who carry out the demands of the leaders. The structure is held together by a chain of command, personal loyalties, a moral code, alliances with rival groups, and hostility toward conventional crime. There is little or no interest on the part of organized crime in the welfare of the larger society.

Then the authors move on to explain how organized crime operates. They say it depends upon the use or threat of force and violence, plus intimidation and bribery. The existence of organized crime is dependent on the maintenance of permanent immunity from interference of law enforcement agents. The authors mention six ways of achieving permanent immunity, only three of which are relevant to the Lebanese system. They are:

- 1) The leaders of organized crime are not usually arrested and prosecuted.
- 2) Persons lower in the hierarchy, if arrested, are likely to be released by action of their superiors.
- 3) Organized crime gains political power by contributing to political organizations. Elected officials may owe their election to organized criminals. Regular "pay offs" to officials provide protection.

The second article is "The Organization of Criminals for Profit and Power" by George B. Vold. Vold makes the point that political graft and corruption are always intimately related to effective organization of crime. He adds that the political machine easily becomes corrupt and a ready and willing partner with organized criminals. He points out that dishonest elections couldn't be achieved without the help of organized criminals.

Vold looks at the underworld and the upperworld as two sides of the same coin. He believes that the nature and character of the underworld

is a reflection of the kind of business integrity and political morality that is characteristic of the dominant elements of the community. He states that one of the major corrupting influences in government is that of personal friendships and primary group ties.

Research Setting.

Since most of the Qabadayat spend their time at public cafes, cafes were the most convenient research setting for the respondents. After ten or fifteen interviews, the setting was shifted to the homes of the Qabadayat, which proved to be a much better research setting. This transition was made possible through the help of my two friends.

The Data Collection Tool.

The instrument used was the interview schedule. An interview form was constructed and pretested. Many questions were constructed to test various theories of crime causation. Changes on the basis of the pretest were introduced, the interviews were then conducted in Arabic, and later translated into English.

The interview schedule was designed to obtain information about the following aspects of the Qabadayat criminal system:

- 1) the neighborhood in which these Qabadayat grew up;
- 2) their family life while growing up and at present;
- 3) their criminal activities past and present;
- 4) their experience with law enforcement agencies;
- 5) their relationships with politicians;
- 6) their social values; the aim here was to determine the extent to which their values are conducive to violence;
- 7) their own attitudes towards their present way of life;
- 8) their relationships with their community, i.e., are they outcasts, are they accepted by the community, are they needed by the community, or are they parasites on the community.

(1) The question asked about the neighborhood in which the Qabadayat grew up is: Could you describe the kinds of people who lived in your neighborhood when you were growing up?

Probes: Do you remember seeing any fighting on the streets in your neighborhood?
Did any of the people in your neighborhood carry weapons?
Did any of them ever break any law and get away with it?
Did any of them ever get into trouble with the police?

(2) Several questions were asked about the respondents' family life while growing up and at present. These questions are:

- 1) With whom did you live from age 5 to 21 (approximately)?
Probes: With both parents? Were they divorced? Did either die? With what other relatives did you live?
- 2) What was your family life like?
Probes: How did your parents get along? Was there any fighting in the family? Were there any problems such as alcoholism, use of hashish? Was anyone ever in trouble with the law, or get into fights?
- 3) What were your parents like?
Probes: What was your father's occupation?
What was the income (monthly) of your family approximately?
How well off were you?
How much education did your father have?
How much education did your mother have?
Were your parents strict or permissive?
What did they do to you when you misbehaved?
Did they ever beat you for misbehaving?
Did your family give you enough pocket money?
- 4) Did you feel when you were growing up that your family just didn't have enough money for necessities?
Probes: How did you get money?
Did you feel that others were well off and did not deserve it?
Did you feel you should have more than you did?
Did you feel that anyway of getting a better life was worth it regardless of the means?
- 5) How many brothers and sisters do you have?
- 6) How many older brothers and sisters do you have?

7) How often do you see your parents now?

Probes: Do you give money to your parents and/or brothers and sisters now?

If yes, how much?

(3)&(4) Questions asked to measure the criminal or illegal activities (past and present) of respondents and their experience with law enforcement agencies are:

1) When you were growing up did you ever get into fights yourself?

Probes: What kinds of things would start them?

Did you ever get into trouble with the police when you were growing up?

If yes, how did it happen; what had you done; how did it turn out?

2) Would you please tell me one or two incidents (events) which you consider the most exciting which happened to you?

3) What kind of activities (crimes) do you do alone, and which with others?

4) How often do you get into fights with others?

What kind of things start these fights?

5) Have you ever been in a bad scrape?

Probes: What happened?

How did you get out of it?

Did anyone help you?

If yes, what was his relationship to you?

6) Have you ever been in trouble with the police?

Probes: Could you tell me about this?

What did you do?

Did anyone help you? If yes, what was his relationship to you?

Have you been in jail? If yes, how many times and for what offenses?

7) Have any of your friends been in a bad scrape?

Probes: Could you tell me about that?

Did you ever help someone in trouble? With the police?

8) When did you first start carrying a weapon?

Probes: What was it?

How did this happen?

(5) Questions asked to determine the relationship between the

Qabadayat and politicians are:

- 1) Were you active during the last elections?
If yes, what did you do? For whom?
- 2) Do you feel that since big men are stealing things easily,
you have the right to get things from them?
- 3) Are you protected by a big man?
What do you expect from him?
Probe: If yes, if you lost his protection and couldn't get
the protection of other big men what would you do?
- 4) Would he help you if you get into trouble?
Probes: Has he ever helped you? In what ways?
- 5) What does he expect from you?
Probes: What kinds of favors does he ask you to do for him?
What kinds of things have you done for him?
- 6) How loyal are you to him?
Probe: What is your relationship with him like (respect,
fear, etc.)?
- 7) Do you believe if the Qabadayat lost the protection of big
men that they would look for other jobs?
Probe: If these big men were different, do you think others
would be encouraged to follow your path?
- 8) Who are the big men?
Probe: What statuses do they have?

(6) Questions designed to measure the social values of respondents
are:

- 1) If people owe you something and they don't give it to you,
what would you do?
- 2) Do you think life is mainly determined by one's efforts?
- 3) Do you think life is mainly determined by luck?
- 4) Which do you think is most important--one's efforts, or luck?
Probe: Why?
- 5) Which do you think is most important--what you are, or whom
you know?
That is, what is more important--being tough, or knowing the
right men?
- 6) If you thought someone was insulting your manliness, what
would you do?
- 7) What would most of your friends do?

- 8) What kinds of things would be an insult to your manliness?
- 9) If you thought someone had insulted your dignity, what would you do?
- 10) What would most of your friends do?
- 11) What kinds of things would be an insult to your dignity?
- 12) If one of your female relatives misbehaved, what would you do?
- 13) If the same thing happened to your friends, what do you think they would do?
- 14) What would you consider misbehavior on her part?

(7) Questions asked to measure their attitudes towards themselves

are:

- 1) How is it you have come to live as you do today, that is, are there any particular events which stand out in your memory as important?
Probe: If reformed, why did you leave your former way of life?
- 2) Do you feel you have achieved what you want in life?
Probes: What have you achieved?
What haven't you achieved?
Are there any ways in which you would like to change your present life? What are your plans (or aims) for the future?
How satisfied are you with your way of life?
- 3) Do you prefer your present way of life to a more conventional way of life, say working for a company?
Probe: Why or why not?
- 4) What do you think of those who work 8 or 10 hours a day to earn a living?
- 5) What advantages do you think your way of life offers to you?
- 6) What disadvantages does your position have, if any?
- 7) Do you think anybody can play your role?
Probes: Does it take special qualities?
What are they?

(8) Questions asked to find out their relationship with their community are:

- 1) Was there anyone in particular you admired, someone you wanted to be like when you were growing up?
Probes: Who were they?
Why did you admire them?
- 2) How did other people regard you when you were growing up (during your teen years)?
Probe: As brave, tough, a good fighter, etc.
- 3) How did you regard yourself? (Same probes as above)
- 4) Do you feel admired, envied, or feared by others?
Probes: By whom?
Why?
- 5) What kinds of favors do you do for people?

Chapter Three

Characteristics of the Sample Population

Due to the incomparability of this study with the literature and due to the lack of prior scientific knowledge about the subject of the study, I am not going to present any specific hypotheses. The analysis is going to be essentially descriptive, and will include the following, each of which will be discussed in a separate chapter.

- 1) Characteristics of the population.
- 2) Description of the criminal system. The organization of the Qabadayat, its system of ranks and power, and relationships among the members will be considered.
- 3) Description of the relationship between the criminal and political systems.
- 4) Analysis of the relationship between being a Qabaday and variables such as types of people in their neighborhood, early family life, cultural view, status in the community, law enforcement agencies, and protection.

Characteristics of the Population

We have obtained definite information on the following demographic variables: a) age, b) education, c) marital status, d) family background.

Information about the two variables of income and occupation is not specific enough for most of the respondents, either because the respondents were not willing to provide information about income, or because they did not have a specific occupation. However, specific information was provided by some respondents on both variables.

As for income of respondents, 48 respondents or 66.8% did not give their income. However, those who gave an income seem to make very good money. Eight respondents, or 11.0% earn 1000 - 2000 L.L. per month, and 16 respondents, or 22.2% earn over 2000 L.L. a month. (For income, see

table below.)

<u>Monthly Income</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
Unspecified	48	66.8
1000 - 2000 L.L.	8	11.0
Over 2000 L.L.	<u>16</u>	<u>22.2</u>
Total	72	100.0

In the case of occupations, 33 respondents, or 45.8% have no occupation at all; that is they do not work or have never worked. Sixteen respondents have no specific occupation, but they do any casual or miscellaneous work, such as protecting night clubs, beaches, etc. Eleven respondents, or 15.3% are in business such as owning a restaurant, a cafe, a gas station, or being a smuggler, etc. Ten respondents, or 13.9% do not work because they own property and do not need or do not like to work. One respondent is an unskilled worker and another is a skilled worker. For occupation see table below.)

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
None	33	45.8
Business	11	15.3
Property owner	10	13.9
Miscellaneous work	16	22.2
Skilled	1	1.4
Unskilled	<u>1</u>	<u>1.4</u>
Total	72	100.0

a) Age. The age distribution of the population in my sample ranges from 18 to 73 years of age. The largest age group of the Qabadayat is 25-29. Nineteen, or 26.4% of the respondents of the sample fall in that age group. The second largest age group (13 respondents or 18.2% of the sample), falls in the category of 20-24 years of age.

Other age groups are: eleven respondents, or 15.3% of the sample, fall in the category 35-39. Nine respondents, or 12.5% fall in the category 30-34. Eight respondents, or 11.0% fall in the category 40-44. The number of Qabadayat in other age groups is much less. Only 5.6% of the respondents are under 20 years old. Three percent of the respondents are of the age 50-59. (See Table 1 below.)

Table 1. Age Distribution

<u>Age</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
under 20 years	4	5.6
20-24	13	18.2
25-29	19	26.4
30-34	9	12.5
35-39	11	15.3
40-44	8	11.0
45-49	4	5.6
50-54	2	2.8
55-59	1	1.4
over 60	<u>1</u>	<u>1.4</u>
Total	72	100.0

b) Education. The most apparent fact, as far as the education of respondents is concerned, is that none of them has received any university education. The second fact is that around half of them have received elementary education, or somewhere from 1-6 years of schooling. Five respondents, or 6.9%, received 1-3 years of schooling. Twenty-nine respondents, or 40.2% received 4-6 years of schooling. The two groups together form 47% of the sample. Twenty respondents, or 27.9% of the sample, have no schooling at all, or they are illiterate. Seven respondents, or 9.7% of the sample, have reached junior high school level, and 11 respondents, or 15.3% of the sample, have obtained high school diplomas.

In general the educational level of the respondents is low: 75% of them have not achieved more than sixth grade. (For distribution see

Table 2 below.)

Table 2. Education

<u>Years of Schooling</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
None	20	27.9
1-3	5	6.9
4-6	29	40.2
7-9	7	9.7
10-12	11	15.3
University education	<u>0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	72	100.0

c) Marital Status. Our respondents are divided on this variable into two major groups: single and married, which are very close to each other. Thirty-seven respondents, or 51.4%, are single, and 20 respondents or 40.2% are married. Two respondents were engaged, and four were divorced or separated or widowed. (See Table 3 below.)

Table 3. Marital Status

<u>Marital Status</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
Single	37	51.4
Married	29	40.2
Engaged	2	2.8
Divorced, separated or widowed	<u>4</u>	<u>5.6</u>
Total	72	100.0

d) Family Background. Four variables are selected to give a picture of the family background of the respondents. These variables are: father's occupation; father's income; father's education; and mother's education.

Father's occupation: The respondents' fathers fall into two main occupa-

tional groups: unskilled workers and property owners. Nineteen respondents, or 26.4%, have unskilled fathers. The same number of respondents have fathers who are property owners. These two groups are followed by respondents with skilled fathers, i.e., carpenter, blacksmith, etc., there are 12, or 16.5%. The rest of the fathers fall into various occupational groups, 9.7% of the fathers are small merchants, i.e., shopkeepers and 4.2% had no occupation. None of the fathers was a professional. (For father's occupation see Table 4 below.)

Table 4. Family Background

<u>Father's Occupation</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
Unskilled	19	26.4
Skilled	12	16.5
Peasant or farmer	4	5.6
Small merchant, i.e., shop- keeper	7	9.7
Public employee	2	2.8
Big merchant	1	1.4
Property owner	19	26.4
Other, i.e., smuggler, priest, painter, deputy	4	5.6
None	3	4.2
Don't know	1	1.4
Professional	0	0.0
Total	72	100.0

Father's income: Father's income was given in terms of the local currency, Lebanese pounds. To obtain income in U.S. dollars one has to divide by three. The analysis of father's income is difficult because of the change in incomes over the past generation or two, and because of the change in the standard of living. Today the Lebanese government has set the minimum wage at 150L.L. per month. I estimate 250 L.L. as subsistence income. When most respondents gave their fathers' income they were referring to a period of ten to fifteen years ago. The subsistence income for that period was probably around 100 L.L. a month.

Nine fathers, or 12.5%, earned less than 100 L.L.; 15 fathers, or 20.8%, earned 100-200 L.L. However, the largest group of fathers, 16 or 22.2%, had a very high income: over 2000L.L. a month. This income group is mainly property owners. Three fathers, or 4.2%, had a relatively good income. Thirteen respondents, or 18.2%, do not know what their father's income was, and five respondents, or 6.9%, said their fathers' income was not fixed. (For father's monthly income see Table 5 below.)

Table 5. Family Background
(Father's income per month)

<u>Income</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
Less than 100 L.L.	9	12.5
100-199	15	20.8
200-299	8	11.0
300-399	3	4.2
400-499	3	4.2
Over 2000	16	22.2
Unspecified	5	6.9
Don't know	<u>13</u>	<u>18.2</u>
Total	72	100.0

Father's education: A majority of the fathers are illiterate. Fifty-seven fathers, or 79.1%, have no schooling at all. Only 10 fathers, or 13.9%, have elementary education. One father has a high school diploma, and three fathers have received university education.

In general, the educational level of the fathers is very low, however, many respondents have qualified such a low level among their fathers by statements such as, "there were no schools at their time" and "there was no education when my father was of school age." To a great extent, the respondents are justified in their qualifications. (For father's education see Table 6 below.)

Table 6. Family Background
(Father's education)

<u>Education</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
None	57	79.1
1-3	0	0.0
4-6	10	13.9
7-9	0	0.0
10-12	1	1.4
University education	3	4.2
Don't know	<u>1</u>	<u>1.4</u>
Total	72	100.0

Mother's education: What I said about father's education is equally true of mother's education since education was a taboo for women and considered a social evil. Women were not expected or supposed to know how to read and write so as not, as the old people repeat, "to be able to write love letters."

Sixty-four mothers, or 88.8%, are illiterate. Four mothers, or 5.6%, have 4-6 years of schooling. Two mothers have 10-12 years of schooling, and only one mother has an university degree. (For mother's education see Table 7 below.)

Table 7. Family Background
(Mother's Education)

<u>Education</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
None	64	88.8
1-3	0	0.0
4-6	4	5.6
7-9	0	0.0
10-12	2	2.8
University education	1	1.4
Don't know	<u>1</u>	<u>1.4</u>
Total	72	100.0

Our respondents seem to come from different family backgrounds. We cannot claim a majority being poor, or lower class, nor is a majority

rich, middle, or upper middle class. In terms of social and economic background, the largest two groups of our respondents come from poor lower class people and property owners. Other respondents come from all walks of life.

However, we notice the absence of Qabadayat with a professional family background. This could be explained by the fact that families with a professional father are apathetic to the present system of power, or they are outside and alien to that system. Another possible explanation is that families with a professional father have many other, safer avenues for careers open to their sons.

Chapter Four

The Criminal System

Basic to a description of the criminal system and the way it operates, is a description of the geographical and social setting in which it operates, namely the neighborhood.

The description is subjective and it was left to each respondent to describe the kinds of people in his neighborhood as he sees them. The question asked is: Could you describe the kinds of people who lived in your neighborhood when you were growing up? Probes designed to focus on important aspects relevant to the study are:

- 1) Do you remember seeing any fighting on the streets in your neighborhood?
- 2) Did any of the people in your neighborhood carry weapons?
- 3) Did any of them ever break any law and get away with it?
- 4) Did any of them ever get into trouble with the police?

A content analysis of the replies to the question and the probes follows:

The Qabadayat interviewed live in different areas of Beirut, Saida and Tripoli. However, those areas are very similar, almost identical, in their physical setting and in the social and communal life of their dwellers. These areas are known as "sha'biah" or popular areas. Traditional areas is an equally valid term.

It is easy to tell from the different replies to the questions that most respondents described their neighborhood in terms of their reference groups or in terms of the most striking aspect to them. In order to get a full view of the areas in which these people lived, it is best to piece their descriptions together.

The respondents tended to describe their neighborhoods on one of two levels: the structural level and the individual level.

On the structural level, a content analysis of their comments presented certain facts. The first fact is that a majority of the areas' population is poor and belongs to the working and lower middle classes. There lives in the areas a number of rich families who are merchants or property owners. (Property usually refers to buildings.)

The second fact is that these people care a lot about local politics, because it touches their daily lives, and therefore are split into two or more factions.

The third fact is that these people are manipulated by the Zu'ama, the government, and the feudal families.

The fourth fact is that the role of the Qabaday is integrated into the social structure, and in every area there are a number of Qabadayat.

The fifth fact is that these people are conservative, stick to the morals, and are ready to defend their religious beliefs.

On the individual level, a number of common characteristics also stand out. One personal characteristic is that they are emotional and difficult to control, because every one behaves as if he is a Za'im.

Second, is that they are strong, tough, and aggressive people, among whom only the tough and aggressive can live.

Third, is that they are gallant, helpful, and they value honour and dignity.

A fourth characteristic is that some of them are hard workers: while others are lazy, spend their time in cafes playing cards and chatting, worry about nothing, and have many "heroic" fights.

Some of them spend every penny they get on gambling, horse racing, alcohol, or drugs.

Some of them frequent prisons, and as two respondents put it would

"kill a man for 10 L.L. or even one L.L."

The following is a comprehensive list of their descriptions:

"Poor and good people, but those who employ them are not fair to them, i.e., underpay them. Among them you find thieves, Qabadayat, dirty guys, and imposters."

"Municipality workers, dock workers, porters, skilled workers, taxi drivers, and unemployed."

"Poor people, with some rich and property owners, controlled by three or four rich families. It has many Qabadayat and 80% of them carry weapons."

"Destitute, who don't find enough to eat. Their kids grow up to be thieves and criminals. We have more than 20 Qabadayat who are better off than the rest of the people in the neighborhood."

"There is a strong belief in religion. Personal challenges are wide spread among the young men."

"It is famous for being the source of Qabadayat and men. Our men frighten all the men of other areas. We produce the strong and gallant men who defend all the Muslims."

"The Zu'ama and the government steal their living and live on their expense."

"People who, after securing their food, care about two things: politics and gambling."

"Used by feudal families in the south."

"The Qabadayat get their right from the rich and the Zu'ama by the strength of their muscles."

"Strong courageous men who fear nothing."

"Poor, but have honour and dignity."

"Most of them are good and peaceful people, who send their children to school, who later become teachers or employees. Some are alcoholics, drug addicts, and Qabadayat."

"Some are respectable, some are bad, and do not work."

"Dirty bastards, their women are 'prostitutes,' and they kill a man for one L.L."

"Peasants who live on farming. Every day of their life is like the other day."

"Poor farmers and workers who are split and hate each other due to Zu'ama, families, and political disputes."

"Poor people, who fear the Qabadayat and do whatever they ask them to do."

"Average people, who care a lot about local politics and drink a lot."

"Very aggressive; no one but the aggressive can live among them."

"Simple people who sit in cafes, lazy and like to play cards. Have nothing to worry about. Have too many 'heroic fights.' "

"Lack of money leads them to crime and prisons."

"Qabadayat who understand nothing but force and respect, and fear no one but the strong."

"Emotional people, who are difficult to control, because everyone behaves as if he is a Za'im and snubs everyone else."

"They are very helpful. A popular area."

"They are the cause of their own poverty because they get 10 or 12 children and leave them in the streets to become criminals. They don't take care of them or educate them."

"Their mania is challenge, and all like to become Zu'ama."

"Good people, who struggle to live, and their Zu'ama obtain their rights from the government."

"Conservative people, whose daughters are very well mannered, and whose sons are strong and honest."

"Most of them are uneducated, and many do not work--the most famous people for using razors in fights."

"They spend every penny they earn on gambling and horse racing."

"Ordinary people. Some work and some do not. They like the Qabaday and try to be friendly and close to him."

"Poor, but very generous."

"Broke people, who fight even their 'shadow.' The government is against them. Luck is against them, and employers are against them."

"They get into many fights because of scarcity."

A content analysis of our focused probes has given the following picture:

On the first probe, "Do you remember seeing any fighting on the streets of your neighborhood?" the 72 respondents all replied positively. Most of them added more positive remarks like "daily," "always," "thousands of them," "fights are quite an ordinary scene," and "fights are inevitable."

These remarks show that the amount of violence is high in the areas concerned. From their descriptions of fights they saw, the causes of violence fall into three broad categories:

- a) local politics and rivalry and hatred among Zu'ama, and in turn among their followers.
- b) challenge among some young men on the "control" of a street, neighborhood, or a whole area.
- c) Personal reasons; these could be very serious or very trivial.

A comprehensive list of description of fights by respondents follows:

"Daily. A Qabaday shot at three men and killed one. Fights with coke bottles, chairs, etc."

"Fights are quite an ordinary scene. A young man tried to rape a girl; her brothers stabbed him 14 times."

"The men of a certain family attacked a cafe with guns."

"Four attacked a man in his shop due to a previous conflict. They stabbed him and escaped."

"Certain Qabadayat fought others. They used machine guns; 25 were wounded."

"I saw thousands of them."

"Fights were inevitable."

"A driver who stuck on his car the picture of a politician passed by an area which hates that politician. They stopped him, beat him, broke the glass of his car, and pierced the tires."

"Often. Men shoot each other or stab each other for the sake of one Za'im or another."

"A man beating his wife in the street, kids throwing stones at each other, or fighting with sticks and knives."

All respondents answered "yes" to the second probe: "Did any of the people in your neighborhood carry weapons?" The responses ranged from mere "yes" to "yes, some of them," to "yes, most of the strong young men," to "yes, most of them," to a more specific reply in the case of five respondents: "80% carry guns; a few carry knives," or "all of us carry weapons."

The weapons mentioned were shot guns, knives, guns, razors, knife blades, and sticks. Three respondents mentioned that a few big men have machine guns in their cars. Two respondents said machine guns were used at least on two occasions.

The third probe was "Did any of them ever break any law and get away with it?" All respondents answered in the affirmative. The degree of confirmation varied from "yes," "yes, some of them," "yes, only the Qabadayat," "yes, only the men of big families."

The major reason given for the fact that some law violaters get away with their offense is wastah, and the variations of wastah, such as protection, knowing big influential personalities, and having relatives or friends in key positions, such as police officers. Wastah, as a reason was mentioned by all 72 respondents.

Other less important and less agreed upon reasons were given. Bribery was mentioned by four respondents. "The police are afraid to interfere in the area" was mentioned by two respondents.

A comprehensive list of reasons for escaping punishment follows:

"Yes, because they have wastah."

"Yes, because their parents go to the Za'im and ask his help. He fixes the case."

"Yes--the men of big families and feudalists."

"Yes, because he is protected, and because the victim withdraws his rights or withdraws the case and they give him some money."

"Yes, for many reasons: the Zu'ama make wastah, the police are afraid to interfere in the area, and bribery."

"The Qabadayat only, because the law is not applied to them; they are above the law."

"Why should we be punished when there is no justice and when the law is not applied equally to all."

On probe four all the respondents answered in the affirmative. The probe was: "Did any of them ever get into trouble with the police?" Some individuals in all areas seem to have gotten into trouble with the police at least once.

The respondents give reasons to explain why some people in their neighborhoods get into trouble with the police. Some accounts were vague like "for countless reasons or for tens of reasons." Other accounts were specific and are of three broad categories:

- a) local political disputes which lead into fights among them, i.e., shooting, assault, etc.
- b) smuggling operations, mainly of drugs and gold.
- c) theft, robbery, drinking and gambling.

A comprehensive list of the respondents' accounts follows:

"Yes--due to fights, shooting, etc. They arrest them and let them go."

"Breaking the law due to local politics and disputes, Zu'ama in the areas, and smuggling operations of gold and drugs."

"Yes, especially during elections."

"Yes, for countless reasons, for tens of reasons."

"Due to the Zu'ama and Zu'ama's business."

"Politics or smuggling."

"Fights, armed robbery, theft, and drinking."

"Gambling, politics and smuggling."

"During the revolution they occupied the police station and turned it into a center of their own."

It should be kept in mind all through the analysis that the Qabadayat are criminals in the legal sense. A Qabaday is a criminal only because he violates a law. As far as his self-image is concerned, he is not a criminal. Nor as far as his image in the community is concerned, is he a criminal. They are not criminals, socially speaking.

The Qabadayat system is not undifferentiated. It is a hierarchy of positions of power. We were able to differentiate four levels of power. We gave each level a label. They are, starting with the most powerful: lieutenants, protectors, hangers-on, and aspirants.

The classification was based on two indicators: 1) The power a Qabaday commands. 2) How is he seen by others in the system of the community.

The power indicator weighs more heavily than the perception of community members. There are two tangible indicators for power:

- a) the number of men the individual commands or relies on.
- b) the extent of his contacts and protection, i.e., how many politicians or national leaders he is affiliated with and the status of those politicians and their power in the government, courts, police system, etc. Relevant here is how many times the person was imprisoned and for how long, that is, avoidance of punishment through wastah.

A Lieutenant: usually commands 200-1500 men. He has wide and intimate contacts with national Zu'ama, is highly protected, and commands sufficient funds. The nature of his relationship to Zu'ama is more or less of equal standing, i.e., they need his support badly. Also it is very unlikely that he would be imprisoned.

A Protector: is usually affiliated with a lieutenant, then through him with Zu'ama. Occasionally he may be directly linked with Zu'ama.

His relationship to Zu'ama is not of equal standing, he needs them more than they need him; he respects them while they treat him casually. His power is limited: he relies on or commands a dozen up to fifty men, and his funds are small and insufficient. Contrary to the lieutenant, the protector is quite likely to spend some time in jail every now and then.

A Hanger-on: is usually the poor, often unemployed guy. He is financially broke, and his power is limited to a handful of friends. He is used by lieutenants and protectors to commit crimes or "do their dirty jobs." In return he receives some money and some protection, i.e., his chances of imprisonment are high, but sentences are relatively short, one month to two or three years. He, unlike the other three groups, exhibits a criminal self-image, and he is labeled and stigmatized.

An Aspirant: has an indicator which isn't present in the other types, namely age. He is usually 17 to 20 years old. He commands no power at all. He is still in the elementary stage of proving himself. He tries to boss his street or area and tries to be close to protectors and lieutenants. However, they treat him "carelessly" and pay little attention to him. He, on the other hand, respects them and conceives of them as his little gods.

A CHART OF THE QABADAYAT SYSTEM



The first question asked to get at the past record of the respondents was: "When you were growing up did you ever get into fights yourself?" "What kinds of things would start them?"

All our respondents say that they did get into fights while they were growing up.

Several reasons were given as the kinds of things that would start those fights. There were four reasons mentioned by a good number of our respondents. The most mentioned cause of fighting was "challenge over controlling the area." It was mentioned by 21 respondents. The second cause most frequently mentioned was "challenge to know who is stronger." It was mentioned by 15 respondents.

The two reasons are not independent of each other, and they do overlap. Taken together, the two responses were mentioned by 36, or 50% of our respondents.

The third reason was mentioned by ten respondents. It was "childish reasons, ordinary, daily, childish fights." Although the respondents did not specify what the childish reasons were, we can assume they could be any petty or temporary reason such as disagreement over the rules of a game, teasing, or silly arguments over a movie star.

The fourth reason was mentioned by eight respondents; and it was "fights with boys who cursed my family." Other infrequently mentioned reasons were:

"To help a friend in a bad scrape."

"I was aggressive and attacked other kids."

"The least mistake led to a fight. We were not very tolerant of each other."

"Yes, with tram ticket collectors; with people we know and people we do not know."

"Disagreement over distributing stolen goods."

"With kids who cursed my religion."

"Yes, my mother taught us to beat anyone who attacks us, and not to fear anybody."

One response that revealed the orientation of the respondents to the Qabadayat way of life was mentioned by three respondents. It was: "I used to behave like and imagine that I am like the Qabadayat, whom we admire and whose stories we tell daily. So I started to get into fights in order to prove myself and attract the attention of the Qabadayat."

The other part of the respondents' past record was their trouble with the police, and the reasons for these encounters. The question asked was: "Did you ever get into trouble with the police when you were growing up? If yes, how did it happen; what had you done; how did it turn out?"

Forty-two respondents reported that they had gotten into trouble with the police while growing up, and 30 respondents reported that they had not. At first look, it seems very high that 30 out of 72 respondents had no trouble with the police, when all 72 respondents got into fights while growing up. However, it is not high at all when we take into consideration the attitude of police towards kids' trouble and kids' fights. They simply consider them trivial and not worth their attention. As three respondents who had no trouble with the police expressed it, "The police do not care about boys' fights."

The import of the police in boys' deviance or delinquency is quite negligible. This fact was inferred from the outcome of boys who got into trouble with the police. The outcome was always the same: they arrest them, beat them, threaten them, and let them go or hand them over to their parents. Often times the outcome was simply slapping them and letting them go.

Two facts make the role of the police unimportant: First, the family is still very strong and is expected to take care of delinquent children. Second, until recently, there existed no legal body to handle persons under age. Even now there is no probationary system.

As for those who got into trouble with the police, 10 said: "Many times, due to challenge and fights with other kids, the police would arrest me for a few hours and let me go." Five respondents said they got into trouble with the police while "trying to sneak into cinemas, eat at restaurants and run away without paying, the police come, slap, and threaten me." Five respondents got into trouble due to thefts. Three respondents for stabbing. Other individual incidents were:

"Arrest while selling smuggled cigarettes and carrying stolen goods."

"Hitting a kid with a jug on his head. My parents paid all hospital expenses."

"Running a forbidden (illegal) game."

"Throwing stones at neighbor's windows. We were beaten, and our parents replaced the broken glass."

"Climbing walls to watch sports games and getting beaten by guards."

It is very difficult to estimate the contribution of the respondents' violent past to their becoming Qabadayat, since not all boys who get into fights become Qabadayat. It is clear from the findings that there was an orientation towards such a way of life. However, I prefer to interpret their past as a contributing factor, only in the sense that it formed a fertile soil which, if other factors work on it, will produce a Qabadayat out of such people.

Now we move into an analysis of the illegal activities of the Qabadayat. In analyzing fights the Qabadayat get into or illegal activities they carry on, we do not care much for the fight itself or for the

Qabaday's typically heroic description of his role in the fight. Rather, our concern is with the causes of such activities and the mechanism through which the Qabadayat get away with their crimes. However, a description of two or three activities is helpful.

Question 2 ("Would you please tell me one or two incidents [events] which you consider the most exciting which happened to you?") will be included under question 5: "Have you ever been in a bad scrape?" because most respondents described one incident and referred to it on both questions. Question 3: "What kinds of activities (crimes) do you do alone, and which with others?" was a total failure. Most of the respondents refused to answer it, and the few who did gave vague replies such as: "I do all activities with others." Or, "I do all activities alone."

Question 4: "How often do you get into fights with others? What kinds of things start these fights?" was designed to get at the frequency with which the Qabadayat break the law, and at the general scope of their illegal activities.

The distribution of responses was as follows:

<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Number of Respondents</u>
sometimes	46
often	6
always	11
rarely	6
never	3

It is evident from the above distribution, that the Qabadayat, in general, have a high frequency of law breaking. The few who said they rarely or never get in trouble were either old or explained that by saying "very few dare get into a fight with me because I have built a big name for myself."

The main cause of fights, or illegal activities, could be included

under the broad category: "Personal challenge, or services for the Za'im." This major category was mentioned by 65 respondents, or 90.3% of the sample. More specific causes that fall under the above broad category were:

- a) dispute over political work with other groups.
- b) either conflict with the government, or during elections.
- c) due to challenges to "my Za'im" in the area or outside it.
- d) due to competition over buying votes during elections.

Other causes were:

- 1) "The nature of my job, i.e., protecting night clubs, cafes, cinemas, or workers at the port"--mentioned by five respondents.
- 2) "Either I look for a fight or a fight looks for me"--mentioned by four respondents.
- 3) "Some Qabadayat ask me to join them in a fight and pay me"--mentioned by four respondents.
- 4) "Dispute over gambling"--mentioned by two respondents.
- 5) "Over using drugs or over prostitutes"--mentioned by three respondents.
- 6) "We beat anyone who tries to impose 'protection money' on our boss or who threatens him"--mentioned by two respondents.

Caution: The reader will notice that the number of responses is more than the number of respondents. This is so, because a respondent might give more than one cause for his activities. This is true for all similar questions throughout the study.

We can conclude from the analysis of question 4, that the Qabadayat carry on most of their activities because of, or for the sake of, the Zu'ama (the politicians) whether directly in terms of performing services directly demanded by the Zu'ama, or indirectly in terms of personal challenge over the control of an area or a neighborhood; a challenge whose essence is political.

Since the Qabadayat have different illegal activities, and the power of their wastah and connections varies, I find it more meaningful and more necessary to analyze the activities of each group of Qabadayat separately. The same is true in analyzing their relationship to politicians. The sample includes: seven aspirants, 18 hangers-on, seven lieutenants, and 40 protectors.

The next question asked to measure their illegal activities is question number 5: "Have you ever been in a bad scrape?"

Probes: What happened?

How did you get out of it?

Did anyone help you?

If yes, what was his relationship to you?"

A) All seven of the aspirants interviewed said that they have been in a bad scrape. All seven also stated that someone helped them in those scrapes. As for who helped them: two said they were helped by friends; two were helped by Za'im; two by some Qabadayat they know; and one by his father. The form also varied. The two aspirants who were helped by friends received the help in the form of sharing in the fight. Three were saved from imprisonment. Two received a wastah at court (this usually means a suspended sentence or a light sentence).

I chose two bad scrapes by two different respondents to give an idea about their fights. The first case was: "I was in the tram going home. I heard a police officer curse a Za'im I like. I got up, punched the officer and escaped. He shot at me, but missed. He remembered my face, and arrested me after two days. They gave me a tough beating at the station, and they were going to send me to jail. The Za'im concerned, knew about the incident and came to the station. He made me apologize to the officer and got me out. He gave me 100 L.L. and said, "Whenever you need something come and see me."

The second case was: "One night at one Za'im's I got into a fight with two guys. One of them drew his gun and said, 'I am a detective.' I told him go to hell with all the detectives. He shot, but hit his friend. I ran away. They arrested me later and sent me to a military court. The Za'im helped me, and got me a suspended sentence. The detectives were furious. Now I and my family are his men, and all our votes go to him."

It is evident from both cases that the politician had nothing to do with the fight, yet he hurried to help in order to gain more men or more supporters.

B) All 18 hangers-on said they have been in a bad scrape. Fifteen said they have received help, and three said they have not. Five were helped by their area's Za'im. Six were helped by those who pay them to commit crimes. Two were helped by a relative, and two by friends.

In the case of hangers-on we notice that a good number of them were helped by those who hire them to commit crimes. This is true for hangers-on only, because they are ordinary criminals used by the Qabadayat. Only for this reason are they part of the Qabadayat system.

The form of help 11 of them received was wastah. Two of them received financial help to pay the victims. Two others had their friends fight with them.

Two incidents described by hangers-on are:

- (1) "Once I was gambling with four persons whom I did not know. I lost some money and I noticed that they were cheating. I stopped the game and asked for my money. They refused to give it back, so we quarrelled. I shot one of them in the waist and escaped. I disappeared for one month until the case was fixed. I gave myself up and got a year sentence instead of three. My brother-in-law made a wastah for me with

some Zu'ama."

(2) "Once two men tried to impose "protection money" on the night club which I protect. I got into a fight with them and we shot at each other. I shot a client by mistake. They ran away. I was put in jail for one month and I paid the victim 1000 L.L. A certain Za'im made a wastah for me."

C) All 40 protectors have been in bad scrapes. Twenty-one of them said they have received help, and 19 said they have not. However, in reviewing the incidents of the 19 who said they have not received help, I found that they did not need any help in those particular incidents, because they were the aggressors and the cases did not even reach the police.

As for the 21 who received help, 16 of them were helped by Zu'ama for whom they work, get votes for, or support. One protector was helped by a judge, one by a police officer, one by a friend, one by his men, and one by his father.

In the case of protectors, politicians are also the main source of help. The politicians helped the protectors by using their influence at all levels. Five protectors said the Zu'ama got them a low sentence. Four said the Zu'ama prevented imprisonment. Two said the Zu'ama changed the whole record at the police station. One said that the Za'im told the police to leave the case to him. Four others said the Zu'ama made wastah for them.

Two incidents described by protectors are:

(1) "In 1937 I killed a man during the elections, for political reasons.

The Za'im, for whose sake I killed the man, changed the whole case record at the police station and wrote: 'the killer is unknown.' "

(2) "Once, one month before elections some people tried to hang banners

in our area for an opponent to our Za'im friend. I saw them, and told them to take it down. They refused, and brought ten armed men who stood on the street to protect the banners. I told them 'all right, as you like it.' I went to my house on the fourth floor, got my machine gun, and started shooting at them from the balcony. I injured one, and the rest escaped. My men came, took the banners down and stepped on them. The police came. The chief of the patrol was my friend. I told him that some people attacked us, and gave him their descriptions."

D) All seven of the lieutenants said they have been in bad scrapes. Five said someone helped them, and two said no one helped them.

When asked who helped them, the two who received no help and two of those who received help said, "People need my wastah. I know all the big men and frankly they fear me." The three others said they were helped by deputies. All of them refused to say how they were helped.

Two incidents described by lieutenants were:

- (1) "Once a certain politician sent two men who hit me with an iron rod until they broke my arm. I knew who he was, so I sent a young man who hit him, on the face, four times with a razor."
- (2) "In 1954, during elections, a group of persons were visiting the people who were voting for our Za'im, and threatened to kill them if they did vote. We waited for them and got into a big fight with them. One of them shot me in my side, so I shot and killed him. Everyone testified it was self-defence, and that was all."

The significant things in those two incidents are that lieutenants do not fear politicians, and that they use their men in trouble and do not have to be personally involved.

The next question asked (question 6) was designed to know if the Qabadayat fall in trouble with the police, and whether that trouble is direct (a fight with policemen), or indirect (due to their fights with other people). Another thing we wanted to know is, whether they can get away with that and how.

The question was: "Have you ever been in trouble with the police?
 Could you tell me about that?
 What did you do?
 Did anyone help you? If yes, what was his relationship to you?"

Analysis

A) Six out of seven aspirants have been in trouble with the police. They said they fell in trouble with the police due to their fights with others, that is indirectly. All six received help. Those who offered them help in their trouble with the police were the same persons who helped them in their trouble with others. The forms of help were the same.

B) Ten hangers-on said they got into trouble with the police, while eight said they did not. Nine said they received help and only one did not. Those who offered them help were the same persons who did so when they got in bad scrapes, and the forms of help were the same. An additional form of help was the mediation between the hanger-on and his police victim by a Za'im.

C) Twenty-one protectors said they have been in trouble with the police due to their fights with people. Nineteen said they have never been in trouble with the police.

As far as those who have been in trouble with the police are concerned, their helpers and the forms of help were the same as in their bad scrapes. However, as far as the 19 protectors who have not been in trouble with the police are concerned, they shed a new light on their

relationship with the police by explaining why they have not been in trouble with the police. The broad explanation is that they are friends with the police, and ~~there~~ is a mutual need between them and the police.

Aspects of such relationships are:

- a) "The police are my friends. We go out together and we drink together." This aspect was mentioned by five protectors.
- b) "They need my wastah with their superiors"--mentioned by two protectors.
- c) "Three of my cousins are big police officers"--mentioned by one protector.
- d) "They fear us"--mentioned by one protector.
- e) "How am I going to get into trouble with them, when I made wastah to appoint five officers and more than forty policemen"--mentioned by one protector.
- f) "They don't dare come near me, because my uncle, the Za'im, will punish them"--mentioned by one protector.

D) Four lieutenants said they fell into trouble with the police, and three said they did not. All four were helped by Zu'ama. The forms of help were the same, except in the case of one lieutenant, where a new form of help was introduced, namely moving the officer to another area.

The case of that lieutenant is worth citing because it sheds light on the power of lieutenants. He described it as follows: "Once the police officer stationed in my area tried to challenge me. I called him, threatened to kill him if he passed by my house again. The Zu'ama knew about the incident, and tried to mediate between us. I told them the best solution is to move him from the area, so they did."

The major conclusion from the above analysis is that the interference of politicians and Zu'ama renders the police inefficient or neutral, as far as the illegal activities of the Qabadayat are concerned.

The next question we asked was: "Have you been in jail? If yes,

how many times and for what offenses?" The aim of this question is to see who among the Qabadayat goes to jail, and who does not. Also it is important to measure the relative magnitude of escaping imprisonment and of getting light sentences.

Analysis

A) Although all the aspirants have been in trouble, only four out of seven have been to jail. All four have been imprisoned only once and got light imprisonment, 1-6 months. As for the offenses for which they were imprisoned, three have assaulted others with deadly weapons, i.e., stabbing, and one has thrown three sticks of dynamite at a political opponent's house.

B) The case of the hangers-on is quite contrary to that of lieutenants. Seventeen of the 18 hangers-on have been to jail. The largest group, five of them, have been to jail more than five times. Four hangers-on have been to jail three times, and four others only once. Two have been imprisoned five times each, and two have been imprisoned twice each.

Only ten of them have supplied the length of time spent in prison. Hangers-on have heavier prison terms than aspirants and protectors. Seven out of the ten have spent 1-3 years in prison. Two have spent 7-12 months, and only one has spent less than six months. One hanger-on has been to prison 32 times, and although he did not give the number of years spent in prison, it is safe to assume that it is over five years.

Their offenses differ in kind from those of the three other Qabadayat groups. The other Qabadayat call the offenses of the hangers-on "dirty." Twelve hangers-on were imprisoned for assaults with deadly weapons (paid assault, or conflict over gambling). One was imprisoned because he deflowered a girl. One because he made advances to a 13-year old girl. One

for burglary. One for selling smuggled cigarettes. One for being a bookie, and one for interfering with freedom of elections.

C) Twelve protectors out of 40, or 30%, of the protectors have never been imprisoned. When we take their illegal activities into consideration, we find that 30% is a reasonably high figure.

Twenty-eight have been to prison. Eight of them were imprisoned once only, six were imprisoned twice each, and six others three times each. Only one was imprisoned four times. Seven protectors were imprisoned over five times each.

Only three protectors got a total of over five years; four got a total of 3-5 years; eight got a total of 1-3 years; two got a sentence of 7-12 months each; and four were imprisoned 1-6 months each.

A comparison of the protectors' description of their fights and activities on one hand, with the over-all jail sentences they got on the other hand, shows clearly that they were helped or protected. Especially when we consider that four of them have committed murder.

The distribution of their offenses was as follows: twenty-three of them have committed assault with a deadly weapon, mostly shooting. Three of them have beaten up deputies. One shot at the police, and one shot at a Za'im to frighten him. One killed a man who killed his brother. One committed political assassination, and one killed when his dignity was insulted. Only one protector has committed a "dirty" crime: two thefts and four charges of fraud.

D) Six out of the seven lieutenants have never been to jail. Even the one who has been imprisoned more than five times (the total of which was 4-5 years), said he was imprisoned in his early twenties only before he became a lieutenant. This shows that lieutenants are almost completely

immune to imprisonment.

The next aspect we measured was the kinds of friends the Qabadayat had, and the magnitude of their helping those in trouble with others, or with the police. The question asked (question 7) was: "Have any of your friends been in a bad scrape? Could you tell me about that? Did you ever help someone in trouble? With the police?"

Analysis

A) All aspirants said that their friends have been in bad scrapes. Three said that their friends' scrapes were like their own. Two said they were more difficult than their's. Two said the scrapes were fighting, assault, and shooting. One said his friends' trouble was due to challenge, work, or local politics.

All aspirants stated that they have helped their friends by fighting with them. Three aspirants said they helped friends in trouble with the police by getting them wastah. Four aspirants said they did not help friends in trouble with the police.

B) The 18 hangers-on said their friends have been in bad scrapes. Seven said the scrapes were "fights and assaults with deadly weapons." Two said the scrapes were due to political disputes. Two said the scrapes were due to gambling and selling drugs. One said the scrape was due to manslaughter, another said it was due to accomplice to assassination. Three said their friends' scrapes were like their's, and one said they were less difficult than his.

Seventeen said they have helped friends in trouble by fighting with them, and one said he did not help anybody in trouble. Ten said they helped friends in trouble with the police, and eight said they could not help. Eight out of the ten who helped, said they got wastah for their

friends; one said he bribed to save him, and one said he mediated between his friend and his friend's enemies.

C) Only one protector said none of his friends have been in a bad scrape, while 39 protectors said their friends have been in bad scrapes. Twenty protectors said the scrapes were fights and assaults with a deadly weapon. Eighteen said their friends' scrapes were like their scrapes. Three said their friends' scrapes were due to smuggling drugs, one said they were due to conflict over money, and another said they were due to family conflict. Two said some of their friends committed murder and some got killed.

All 40 protectors said they have helped people in trouble, by defending them or beating their enemies. All 40 said they have helped people in trouble with the police. Thirty-one protectors said they helped by making wastah for the people in trouble. Six said they bribed the police. One said he got them a light sentence, one has "fixed the case," and a third has "put his means at their services."

D) All lieutenants interviewed said their friends have been in bad scrapes. Four said the scrapes were due to "elections, votes and political disputes." Two said the scrapes were due to "assault, fights and shooting." Two said the scrapes were due to smuggling, and one said they were due to murder. One said the scrapes were like his own, and one said they were less dangerous than his own scrapes.

All seven lieutenants said they helped friends in trouble with others by defending them or sending their men to help them. All seven have helped friends in trouble with the police by making wastah for them. One lieutenant said he helped with money, and another said he helped by getting his friend out of jail.

In general, it could be inferred from the answers to the above question that all the Qabadayat have at least some friends who have been in trouble with other people and with the police. It could be also inferred that the degree of association of the Qabadayat with other law violators or criminals is high. Also, all the Qabadayat who were able to offer help did offer it, the two most capable groups being the lieutenants and the protectors.

There are two important aspects of the Qabadayat system which I am going to discuss before moving into an analysis of the relationship between the Qabadayat system and the political system. These two aspects are: a) organization, and b) how new individuals join the system or become Qabadayat.

a) Organization:

The Qabadayat system is not highly and rigidly organized. As far as organization is concerned, it is nowhere near organized crime in America. Rather, it is loosely organized, or at best, it can be said that it is semi-organized. There are no channels of communication, nor are there any semi-military orders. The Qabadayat are "the men of" or affiliated with politicians (Zu'ama). The Za'im or the lieutenant can mobilize their men at times of crisis, or when they need them. The Qabadayat do not have to report daily to their Za'im, nor the lower levels to their lieutenant. They go on with their daily life undisturbed. When the need arises, the Za'im contacts a lieutenant, or any of his men. Any Qabadayat, in fact, any individual, can go and see the Za'im personally; however, aspirants, hangers-on, or protectors find it more convenient to demand help or favors through the lieutenants. Only in the cases where the Za'im himself is involved in, or directing an illegal operation, ie., smuggling,

does a rigid structuring exist.

b) Joining the System:

There is no designed process of recruitment as in organized crime. The politician simply welcomes having more men who support him, and there are enough men interested in being "the men of a certain Za'im," in having power and prestige through such an affiliation, and in getting some easy money and other benefits.

It could be inferred from the findings of the study, that some young men admire the Qabadayat and imitate them by resorting to violence and "proving themselves on the streets." Then they approach the Qabadayat, join them in their fights, and in some cases work their way up to the top. Others become Qabadayat because their fathers, brothers and other relatives are Qabadayat. In the latter case, they most often give their loyalty to the same Zu'ama their relatives support.

Chapter Five

The Relationship between the Criminal and the Political Systems

The first question asked to determine the relationship between the Qabadayat and politicians was: "Were you active during the last elections? What did you do? For whom?"

The first part of the question aims at knowing how many were actually involved in political action. The second part of the question aims at knowing the techniques or methods which the politicians resort to, and in what respects they need the Qabadayat.

Analysis

A) Six aspirants said they were active during the last elections. One said he was not, because he was sick. As for their activities in the elections, three aspirants said they helped in hanging banners, and sticking pictures and posters on the streets. Two said they drove cars around, honked horns, and shot in the air (a typical political technique). Two said they were in charge of ten cars, and arranged schedules to drive voters to election centers. Two said they were in charge of protecting voters from pressures and threats. One said he stayed at the Za'im's house to receive voters, and accompany them to election centers. One said he accompanied some Qabadayat in their election visits and tours. One said he joined in attacking several stores, and closing them. All six aspirants said they worked for certain Zu'ama.

B) Eleven hangers-on said they were active during the last election. Five said they were not active, and two said they were in prison at that time.

The activities of the hangers-on are very similar to those of aspirants. However, hangers-on are usually paid to work, while aspirants

volunteer to help. Five said they gathered young men to cheer, hung banners, and posted pictures. Five others said they protected voters. Two were busy buying votes. Three accompanied voters to election centers, and two protected election rallies.

C) All 40 protectors said they were active during the last elections. The activities they did show that their role is of central importance to the Zu'ama.

Eighteen protectors participated in getting votes. Six were election keys, that is, they kept in touch with people in the area to guarantee their votes to the Zu'ama they work for. Twelve protected the voters, and six gathered men to protect election rallies. Four were in charge of protecting the Za'im himself. Four others organized election rallies to support the Zu'ama they work for. Three watched election centers. Five were active in buying votes. Four were in charge of taking voters to election centers and back home. Seven protectors shot or beat their Za'im's enemies. Two accompanied the Za'im in all his visits, and arranged times of visits for him.

D) The seven lieutenants said they were active during the last elections. Four of them worked for Zu'ama who were at the same time their relatives. Three worked for Zu'ama they termed as friends.

As for their role in the elections, five lieutenants said they obtained thousands of votes for their Zu'ama, including votes from people for whom they have done favors. Two said they protected the voters from threats and pressure. One said he bought votes for the Za'im; another said he took voters to election centers; and a third said his men beat those who tried to spoil his Za'im's campaign.

The main activity of the lieutenants, which other groups of Qabadayat

cannot do, is being election keys, that is, getting thousands of votes, or all the votes in their areas for the Zu'ama with whom they are affiliated. Some protectors are election keys, however on a much smaller scale than lieutenants.

The second question asked was meant to see whether the Qabadayat do take money from politicians, and how they feel about that. The question was based on a statement that is heard often in the streets of Lebanese cities. The statement is, "The government and all our Zu'ama are thieves." The question was: "Do you feel that since big men are stealing things easily, you have the right to get things from them?"

Analysis

A) Six aspirants answered "yes" to the question. One said "no," because he does not need money. The comments given were:

"Everybody in this country is a thief."

"That's why I did not get a job."

"I don't see why not, since all are stealing."

B) Sixteen hangers-on said they have the right to take things from Zu'ama, and two said they did not. Some of the comments by hangers-on were:

"I want to live."

"I will not leave everything to them."

"Everyone has the right to take from them."

C) Thirty-three protectors said they have the right to take things from politicians. Seven said they did not, because they are not in need. Some of their comments were:

"They are all thieves and I am their partner whether they like it or not."

"The government is loose, and the smart take things."

"Sure, in return for my efforts."

"Yes, and anyway they are ready to give."

"It is my right because I wasted my life serving them, and still they give me 1/1000 of what they take."

D) Three lieutenants said they have the right to get things from Zu'ama, and four said they did not. The comments of the first group were:

"I only take my rights and manage my business."

"I imposed myself upon them as a partner."

"Why not? I take things, like sand and construction licences, and sell them."

The majority of the Qabadayat believe they have the right to take things from the big men, and they see no reason why they should not.

The third question asked was:

"a) Are you protected by a big man?

b) What do you expect from him?

c) If you lost his protection and could not get the protection of other big men, what would you do?"

Analysis

A) Aspirants:

a) Two aspirants said they were protected by a big man. Three said they were indirectly protected by a big man, that is, they know someone who knows the big man, and can ask him to help them. Two said they were not protected by any big man.

b) The expectation of four aspirants from big men was to get his wastah. One expected some money in addition to the wastah, and another expected finding jobs for his friends.

c) Two aspirants said they will not change their way of life if

they lost the protection of big men and could not get any protection. One said he will change his way of life, and another said he did not know what he will do.

It is very difficult to predict the reaction of aspirants to loss of protection from the above four responses. However, it seems that some of them will change their way of life, although some of them will not.

B) Hangers-on:

a) Seven hangers-on said they are protected by big men, and six said they are not. Five said they are indirectly protected.

b) Nine expected wastah and the protection of big men, and three expected some money in addition to wastah. Two said they expect simple services every now and then, which I suppose refers to wastah.

c) Six hangers-on said they will stop getting into fights and assaulting others if they lost protection. Three said they do not care, because big men do not help them that much. Only one said he will not change his way of life.

The hangers-on seem to be more readily to stop assaulting others than aspirants or lieutenants. Maybe this is because they do not have the same vested interest in the system.

C) Protectors:

a) All 40 protectors said they are protected by big men.

b) Twenty-eight of them said they expected wastah from big men. Eighteen said they expect money and other material benefits. Seven said they expect big men to help them in any service they need.

c) Twenty-eight said they will stop interfering in elections or politics, or getting into trouble if they lost protection. Seven said they will continue to interfere in politics, and to use force to get what

they want. Six others said they do not know what they will do.

D) Lieutenants:

a) All lieutenants said they were protected by big men.

b) Their expectations varied. Three expected big men to protect them from the "injustice" of the authorities. One expected them to facilitate any service he asked for. Two expected big men's wastah. One expected them to ask him to participate in any operation which gives money.

c) Three lieutenants could not answer this part of the question, because they could not imagine the absence of wastah or protection. One of them said, "My wastah will not end unless the whole country ends." One lieutenant said he will go into business. Another said he will not change, but he will be destroyed (without protection). A third said he does not care, because he has popular support.

To sum it up, 64 of the Qabadayat we interviewed said they were protected by big men. They expect two main things from big men: wastah and money. A majority of the hangers-on and protectors will leave the system if they lost protection. The aspirants seem reluctant to withdraw, maybe because they have not really achieved a big role, or have not realized their dreams. Lieutenants feel too confident even to conceive of a different state of affairs.

Question 4 ("Would he help you if you get into trouble? Has he ever helped you? In what way?") is a repetition of questions 5 and 6, regarding the illegal activities of respondents, and the analysis of question 4 is therefore omitted.

The fifth question "What does he expect from you?" measures the other face of the relationship between the Qabadayat and the politicians.

Analysis

A) One aspirant said the big man expects his vote and another said that the big man expected his family's votes. A third said he expects his help in elections. A fourth said the big man expects him to beat his enemies. The expectations big men have of aspirants seem to be very low and relatively trivial.

B) Three hangers-on said big men expect nothing from them. Three others said help in elections is expected from them. Two said they are expected to assault the politician's opponents. One said only his vote is expected.

C) Fourteen protectors said big men expect political support and votes from them. Eleven said they are expected to help in elections. Six said they are expected to do anything they are asked to do. Three said big men expect protection. Three said nothing is expected of them.

D) Big men's expectations of lieutenants seem to be high and vital. All lieutenants said that big men expect them to get the votes within the lieutenant's area, and their political support. Three said big men expect lieutenants to protect them. Three others said partnership in deals was expected. One said they expected him to beat their enemies.

In general, the major expectation of politicians from the Qabadayat is political support or getting them votes, and general help during elections. Another important expectation is physical protection.

The next question asked was, "How loyal are you to him? What is your relationship with him like?"

Analysis

A) One aspirant said he is very loyal to the politician, because he helps him. Another said he is somewhat loyal. One said he is not

loyal at all, and one said he is ready to be loyal.

Two aspirants described their relationship with the politician as weak and indirect. One said it is informal. One said the politician likes him, inquires about his well being, and gives him money without his asking for it.

B) Five hangers-on said they are very loyal to big men, because they need them. Three said they are somewhat loyal, because big men like and help them. Only one said he is "not really loyal."

Five described their relationship with big men as that of a follower to a leader, and added that they like the big men and respect them. Three others described the relationship as weak. One said he needs the politician, and the politician uses him.

C) Twenty-seven protectors said they are very loyal to big men, because the latter like them and are good to them. Three said they are very loyal because they are good friends. Three said their loyalty depends on continuous help and payments by politicians.

Twenty-four protectors describe their relationship with big men as one of "friendship, respect and mutual liking." Six describe it as of mutual need, and three of mutual benefit. One said "I respect him and I will do anything he wants. If he lets me down, I will shoot him."

D) Two lieutenants said they exchange loyalty with politicians. Two said they are friends. Two said they are very loyal to the politicians. One said the big men need him more than he needs them, because he has the popular base.

All lieutenants described their relationship with politicians as very friendly. Three added it is of mutual need; two reported it is of mutual benefit; two replied they have "the same political aims;" and

one said, "mutual respect." Although the relationship between politicians and lieutenants is of need and power, its basis seems to be friendship and personal loyalty.

From the analysis of the above question, it is clear that relationships between big men and their men, the Qabadayat, is a personal one, and more like friendship. There is no evidence that the Qabadayat fear the big men. Mutual need and mutual benefit seem to cement the relationship.

The next question measured the dependence of the Qabadayat system on the political system. It was: "Do you believe if the Qabadayat lost the protection of big men that they would look for other jobs? If these big men were different, do you think others would be encouraged to follow your path?"

Analysis

A) Five aspirants think that the Qabadayat will look for other jobs if they lost the protection of big men. Two said they cannot tell. Some of the comments were:

"If it were not for big men and their money we would not have tried to be Qabadayat."

"Yes, because the financial temptation will disappear, and the threat of prison will be real."

"Politicians create Qabadayat and attract them as honey attracts bees."

Four aspirants said if big men were different others will not be encouraged to follow their path. Three said others will still follow their path but they will not make it.

B) Seventeen hangers-on believed that the Qabadayat will look for other jobs if they lost protection. One said he does not know. Some comments were:

"Yes, the Qabadayat know this better than others."

"Yes, because protection is 3/4 courage and temptation."

Fifteen hangers-on said others will not follow their paths if the big men were different. Three said they do not know. Some comments were:

"No, because the danger will be four or five times higher."

"Certainly not. For example, if they pay me 100 L.L. to hit someone with a razor without providing protection I will not do it."

C) Thirty-nine protectors said the Qabadayat will look for other jobs if they lost the protection of big men. One said he did not know, but he thinks they will be very weak. Some comments were:

"Yes, especially those who resort to violence."

"Sure, they are forced to change."

"If it were not for protection, the Qabadayat have no interest to interfere in elections."

Thirty-nine said others will not follow their path if the big men were different, and one said he did not know. Some comments were:

"No, because we would all be punished then."

"No, because there will be no one to pay them or save them from prison."

"No, because the government will destroy them before they become Qabadayat."

D) All lieutenants said that the Qabadayat will look for other jobs if they lost the protection of big men. Some of their comments were:

"Certainly, the whole order is standing on protection."

"We would be crazy if we do what we are doing without protection."

Six said, others will not follow their paths if big men were different. One said a few will, but they will end up in prison. Some comments were:

"Every incentive dies."

"No. They tempt the poor man with little money, give him a gun and say shoot this or that. He feels as if he owned the world or as if he is a king."

From the above responses it seems that the dependence of the Qabadayat system on the political system is almost total or complete. The dependence of the Qabadayat system on the political system lies in three vital areas: a) protection from prosecution by the law, b) channeling governmental favors by politicians to the community through the Qabadayat which reinforces the position of the Qabadayat, and c) financial support.

Question 8 asks: "Who are the big men? What statuses do they have?" Here I found it more appropriate to combine the responses of all the respondents, because level of power does not affect these perceptions. The result appears in the distribution below:

<u>The big men</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>%</u>
Politicians in general--deputies and ministers	71	98.5
<u>Zu'ama</u> in particular areas	19	26.2
Rich people or millionaires	31	43.0
High government officials	15	20.9
High police or army officers	15	20.9
Big religious leaders	7	9.7
Big families, in general	8	11.0
Judges	3	4.2

Relevant Social Values of the Qabadayat

In the analysis of social values, I am treating the Qabadayat as one group, because cultural or sub-cultural values cut across power groups.

It should be understood that the values that are going to be measured are not exclusive to the Qabadayat. Individuals outside of the Qabadayat system in Lebanon do hold the same views, with equal or less firmness than the Qabadayat. However, people who hold such values are more likely to become Qabadayat than people who have a totally different set of values.

Disagreements do arise among people in day-to-day matters. Some people go to courts to solve their disputes, others try to reach a compromise directly or through mediators. Still others might use force to solve their disagreements. The first question asked was designed to measure the attitudes of the Qabadayat under such conditions. The question was: "If people owe you something and they do not give it to you, what would you do?"

Analysis

Fifty respondents, or 69.5%, of our sample said they will get it by force. Five respondents, or 6.9%, said they will get by force more than what people owe them if those people were nasty. Five others, or 6.9%, said they will beat them, insult them, and let them keep it. Three said they will kill the one who denies them something they owe them. Three said no one dares to deny them a right. This reply implies a threat.

Only three said they will get it decently or by force. Only one said, he will sue before resorting to force, which is very significant. One said he will confiscate an expensive item of theirs, and would shoot them if they try to stop him. Only one respondent said he will forgive them.

The spontaneous, clear-cut responses of the Qabadayat show that they still believe firmly in using force to solve problems or disagreements. The other striking fact is their complete disregard or the absence of any reference to courts or other legal channels. Their responses make one doubt that they ever resort to established legal channels, or even to mediators. They still feel that they should take the law into their hands.

The second question asked was designed to know how much they value

work or personal efforts, if they do at all. The question was: "Do you think life is mainly determined by one's efforts?"

Analysis

The majority of the Qabadayat, 56, or 79%, believe that life is not determined by one's efforts. Fourteen Qabadayat, or 18.2%, think life is determined by one's efforts. Two Qabadayat, or 2.8%, said they do not know whether life is determined by one's efforts or not.

Some of the comments by those who said life is not determined by one's efforts were:

"No, that's nonsense."

"No, efforts have slight importance."

"No, because efforts do not pay."

"No, because no one earns according to his efforts."

"No, because some people work ~~ten~~ hours a day and are still 'hungry.' "

"No, because some bastards do not work and are living better than anybody else."

"Wastah determines life."

"No, family and birth determine one's efforts."

From the comments, one can see that these people have reasons for disbelief in personal efforts. They look around and see the poor working up to 16 hours a day, and yet not able to improve their situation a bit through their life time. At the same time they see people from rich families, or people who have wastah, getting highly paid positions without even reporting to work, in some cases. They come to the conclusion that work is really a waste of time and determines nothing.

Some comments by those who thought personal efforts determine life were:

"Heaven does not rain gold."

"Of course. If I had not made any effort, I would not have reached what I am today."

"Efforts do not determine life, but have great importance."

The third question was: "Do you think life is mainly determined by luck?" Sixty-seven Qabadayat, or 93.1%, thought that life is mainly determined by luck. Five, or 6.9%, thought that life was determined by things such as muscles and wastah.

Some reasons given for the belief in luck as the main force in life were:

"Without luck there is nothing."

"Luck gets money."

"Some idiots who were lucky became rich."

"The proverb says 'Life is Luck.' "

Many respondents said "Luck determines life, and that requires no explanation."

The fourth question asked was: "Which do you think is most important--one's efforts ~~or luck?~~ Why?"

Sixty-six Qabadayat, or 91.8%, thought luck is more important than personal efforts. Three respondents said both are of equal importance. Two respondents said neither was most important, but wastah was the most important thing. Only one respondent said personal efforts are more important than luck.

Some reasons given by respondents as to why they thought luck is more important than personal efforts, are:

"Because every man is born lucky or unlucky."

"Everybody knows this, and it does not need a reason or a proof."

"Luck predetermines one's whole life."

"The doors of heaven open to the lucky."

"All people say so."

"Every single thing in you, or in your life, is caused by luck."

"Luck gets good cards."

"Luck gets wastah."

"The proverb says: You who have no luck, do not strive or struggle."

Such a firm belief in luck usually leads to resignation. They explain where they are and what they are doing by "that's my luck."

The fifth question asked about values was: "Which do you think is more important: what you are or whom you know?"

Analysis

Forty-eight respondents, or 67.5%, thought that "whom you know" is more important than "who you are." Only two respondents, or 2.8%, thought "who you are" is more important. Twenty-one respondents, or 29.1%, thought that both were of equal importance. Only one thought that neither was of any importance. He said money is more important than both. "Get money and you can buy the whole country," he said.

Some reasons given by those who thought "whom you know" is more important were:

"Whom you know, because it gets you wastah."

"In Lebanon especially, because they are the key to the future."

"Without acquaintances, you are nothing."

"The prostitute sometimes is very important, because she knows big personalities."

Some reasons given by those who thought "what you are" is as important as "whom you know" were:

"Equal, because one hand cannot clap."

"One has to be a Qabaday, and to have strong acquaintances."

"Equal. If you are nothing, you will not know any big men."

The two who said "what you are" is more important than "whom you know" explained their rationale by saying, "if you are strong, people like to get to know you," and "people respect you, and not those you know."

Originally we had asked two sets of questions: One about manliness and one about dignity. However, most of the respondents could not differentiate between the two concepts. So the analysis deals with the reaction of the Qabadayat and their friends to an insult to their manliness and/or dignity, and with what they consider an insult to their manliness and/or dignity.

Question 6 asked: "If you thought someone was insulting your manliness and/or your dignity, what would you do?"

Analysis

All 72 respondents said they will react violently. Their reaction fell on a continuum of violent revenge. The lowest end of the continuum was "I will beat him," which was mentioned by six respondents. A stronger reaction was "I will insult his manliness and/or dignity," which was mentioned by 50 respondents. Six respondents said, "I will shoot him." The most extreme reaction was, "I will kill him," which was mentioned by ten respondents.

Question 7 was: "What would most of your friends do?"

Analysis

Seventy-one respondents said their friends would do exactly what they themselves would do, that is react violently. One said, some of his friends will do nothing.

It could be concluded from questions 6 and 7 that the Qabadayat

and their friends cannot stand any insult, and that they will not let it pass without revenge.

Question 8 asked: "What kinds of things would be an insult to your manliness and/or dignity?"

Analysis

There were six main things which most respondents considered an insult to their manliness and/or dignity. These things were:

- a) beating me alone or in front of others.
- b) challenging me in public.
- c) not respecting me.
- d) cursing me.
- e) molesting my female relatives.
- f) ridiculing me, or calling me a woman.

Other infrequently mentioned things were: telling lies about me; denying my rights; insulting me or my Za'im; threatening me or trying to scare me; the least insult, no matter how small.

The next questions were designed to see how many adopt the norm of honour crime, which is a norm of violence. A set of questions were asked to ascertain what they would do if a female relative misbehaves, what their friends would do, and what they consider to be misbehavior on her part.

The question asked to see their reaction to the misbehavior of their female relatives was: "If one of your female relatives misbehaved, what would you do?"

Analysis

Here again it is best to place the answers on a continuum of violent reaction. The lower end of the continuum has one respondent saying, "I

will cut any relationship between us, and God will forgive her." The second type of reaction on the continuum was given by two respondents: it was, "I will beat her and kick her out of my house." The third type of reaction was, "I will send someone to kill her," which was given by two respondents. Another reaction was given by two other respondents: "I will kill my sister or wife, but not other female relatives." Fifty-seven respondents said they will kill or slay her. The top end of the continuum was, "I will kill her and kill her lover," which was mentioned by seven respondents.

Only one respondent falls outside the continuum. He said he will not do anything to her. He rationalized this by saying, "Am I crazy to enter prison for the sake of a 'prostitute?' "

Then they were asked what would their friends do in such a case. Fifty-five respondents said their friends would kill her. Seven said they would kill her and kill her lover. Two said they would beat her, and kick her out of the house. Seven others said it depends on the person--some are cowards who would do nothing, and some would kill her. One respondent said, "All say they'll kill her, but few do." Of course, the last response reflects the difference between norms and actual behavior.

The respondents were also asked what they consider misbehavior on the part of their female relative. All kinds of things, serious and trivial were considered misbehavior by our respondents. The most serious offense according to 46 respondents was "sleeping with or giving herself to one man or to several men." The second most frequently mentioned thing was, "Any sexual relationship with any man other than her husband, before or after marriage"--mentioned by 26 respondents. "Having sex for money or prostituting herself" was mentioned by 17 respondents. "Any deviance

from Arab morals or norms," was mentioned by 12 respondents. The next thing was "disgracing family honour," which was mentioned by 10 respondents. "To get pregnant by a stranger," was mentioned by four respondents, and "losing her virginity," was the reply from two respondents.

A number of other detailed things were considered misbehavior. "Kissing men," was mentioned by five respondents. "Corresponding with men," was mentioned by four. "If people start talking about her," was mentioned by three respondents. Six respondents considered elopement as a misbehavior, and one considered "disobeying her parents in marriage and love," as misbehavior.

Relevant social values discussed in the analysis of the Qabadayat system are possibly contributing factors to becoming a Qabaday, because it was found that an overwhelming majority of the Qabadayat hold such values which are conducive to violence.

Chapter Six

The Relationship of the Qabadayat with their Community

The interaction of the Qabadayat with their community and their integration into the community is of great importance to 1) new members of the community joining the Qabadayat system; 2) the Qabadayat's self-image; and 3) the continuation and acceptance of the Qabadayat system.

The first question asked about this general area was: "Was there anyone in particular you admired, someone you wanted to be like when you were growing up? Who were they? Why did you admire them?"

Analysis

Forty-five respondents said they admired someone while growing up. Fifteen said they did not admire anybody, while 12 said they did not remember.

Out of the 45 who admired someone, 25 said they admired a relative, such as a father, a brother, an uncle, etc. It is interesting that in most cases the relative admired was a Qabaday or a Za'im. Ten respondents said they admired a Qabaday. Nine respondents said they admired a Za'im of the Qabadayat, or the Za'im of their area.

The reasons of admiration seem to revolve around a central theme, namely the person is admired because he is strong, brave, has status in the community, is popular, feared and respected.

The distribution of replies was:

Seventeen respondents said their reason for admiration was: "He was strong, brave, with unlimited courage."

Nine respondents said, "Because he has a position, he is well known and I wanted to be like him."

Eleven respondents said, "Because all the area, or all Beirut feared him."

Seven respondents said, "He was respected, he harmed nobody, and he served the people."

Five respondents said, "Because he was a symbol of strength, manliness, and Za'ama."

Five respondents said, "Because he was popular and a Qabaday."

Three respondents said, "Because he was smart and intelligent."

One respondent said, "Because I think he is a great man."

One respondent said, "Because I heard a lot about him and people told his stories with admiration."

One respondent said, "He used to walk by with his gun and a few men beside him, and all people greeted him with great respect."

The second question asked was: "How did other people regard you when you were growing up?"

Analysis

Twenty-eight respondents, or 39%, said others regarded them as strong.

Twenty respondents, or 27.9%, said other people regarded them as aggressive.

Seventeen respondents, or 23.3%, said others regarded them as brave.

Thirteen respondents, or 18%, said others regarded them as bad.

Seven respondents, or 9.7%, said others regarded them as Qabadayat.

Four respondents, or 5.6%, said others regarded them as tough.

Three respondents, or 4.2%, said they were regarded as nice boys.

Three respondents, or 4.2%, said they were regarded as peaceful and calm.

Two respondents, or 2.8%, said they were avoided by others.

One respondent, or 1.4%, said he was regarded as one who supports what is right.

One respondent, or 1.4%, said he was regarded as one of strong will.

Six respondents, or 8.3%, said they were regarded as intelligent.

Four respondents, or 5.6%, said they were regarded as stubborn.

Two respondents, or 2.8%, were regarded as lazy; two others as reckless and careless; and two others as smart.

One respondent said he was respected because of his family.

The only three undesirable qualities with which some respondents were regarded were: "aggressive" and "bad" and "they avoided me." The rest of the qualities, 14 in number, were desirable and reflect that on the whole they felt they were accepted, or even admired by other people. This might be an encouraging factor for them to pursue their aim of becoming Qabadayat.

The third question asked was: "How did you regard yourself?"

Analysis

Twenty respondents, or 27.9%, said they considered themselves very strong.

Thirteen respondents, or 18%, said they regarded themselves as very brave.

Fourteen respondents, or 19%, regarded themselves as Qabadayat and good.

Seven respondents, or 9.7%, said they regarded themselves as having sufficient strength and courage to become big Zu'ama.

Four respondents, or 5.6%, said they wanted to make it by force, and four others regarded themselves as smart.

Five respondents, or 7.0%, regarded themselves as intelligent.

Two respondents, or 2.8%, regarded themselves as ambitious, two others as very stubborn.

Four respondents considered themselves as aggressive, four others as good, and two as bad.

One respondent considered himself as unlucky, and another as having a strong will.

The most interesting thing in comparing how people regarded our respondents and how they regarded themselves, is that those who were regarded as "good" accepted such an image and regarded themselves similarly. However, out of the 20 who were regarded by others as aggressive only four said they regarded themselves as aggressive. Similarly out of the 13 who were regarded as bad by other people, only two regarded themselves as bad.

The above finding enables us to generalize that most Qabadayat accepted desirable conceptions of themselves by others and rejected undesirable conceptions of themselves by other people.

In the next two questions I am going to return to an analysis based on the different levels of Qabadayat, because the two questions relate to the power element.

The next question was: "What kinds of favors do you do for people?"

Analysis

A) All aspirants said they do favors for people. Five aspirants said they fight with them or defend them. One aspirant said he makes wastah for them. Another said he trains them in wrestling, and a third said he asks a Qabaday to help them. One aspirant, who comes from a rich and influential family said, "I find them jobs, give them money and get them out of trouble."

B) Fifteen hangers-on said they do favors for people, and three said they do not because they are unable to.

Five hangers-on said they defend people, and fight with them. Six others said, "Anything I can do." One said, "Anything they ask for except money." One said, "I lend them money, if I have it," and one said he gets them jobs.

C) All protectors said they do favors for people.

Twenty-one protectors make wastah for people in courts, prisons, and police departments.

Ten protectors get all kinds of licences, or facilitate other government formalities for people.

Nine protectors said they do anything people ask for.

Seven protectors said they get people some money.

Six protectors said they get them jobs.

Four protectors said they pressure their Za'im to help people.

Three protectors said they defend people or fight for them.

Two protectors said they do simple services for people.

One said he has an electoral office to see to people's needs.

One said he mediates between them.

D) All lieutenants said they do favors for people. Six lieutenants said they make wastah for people in government offices, and in courts to get them out of trouble. Four lieutenants said they help people financially. One lieutenant said that he gets them all kinds of licences, i.e., guns, commercial, importing, etc. Two lieutenants said they defend people. One lieutenant said he mediates between people, and another said, "Anything they ask for; I am at their service."

The findings show that 96% of the Qabadayat interviewed do favors for people, and that the most needed services are done by lieutenants and protectors. Most aspirants and hangers-on offer what they have, i.e., their muscles.

The last question asked was: "Do you feel a) admired, b) envied, c) feared by others? By whom? Why?"

Analysis

A) All aspirants feel admired by kids in their neighborhoods. They think they are admired because every young man wants to be a Qabaday, and because they like their manliness.

b) Six aspirants do not think they are envied, while one thinks he is envied by his friends because he is rich, brave and has status.

c) Six aspirants feel they are feared by others, while one thinks he is not. Three of the six feared say they are feared by people in their area. Two say they are feared by those who know them. One says he is

feared by people in his area and in other areas. One said he was feared, because people fear the aggressive. Three said because people fear the strong. One said because they saw his fights and heard about his other fights. One said they are polite to him because they fear he will beat them one day.

B) Ten hangers-on feel they are admired by others, while eight feel they are not. Seven feel they are admired by young men in the area; three by their friends, and two by their brothers. Four say they are admired because others would like to know how to get to their position. One says, "Because others think his life is beautiful and easy." Three say because every one likes to be strong. Two say because those who admire them want to be wrestlers.

b) Seven hangers-on feel they are envied while eleven feel they are not. Two say they are envied by competitors for bossing the area. Two by young men in the cafe. One by some workers from his area, and one by friends. Two say they are envied by others because they are stronger and more protected. Two because they got the job of protecting the cinemas, which others want. One says he is envied because of his physical strength, and another because he is seen relaxing in the cafe all the time.

c) Thirteen hangers-on think they are feared by others, while five think they are not. Seven say they are feared by people in the area. Four by those who saw their fights, and two are feared by their enemies. Five say they are feared because they are very aggressive and nasty in fights. Five others say, because they are strong and people fear the strong. One is feared because others are afraid he will attack them. One because they heard about his fights, and another says, "All people fear the razor."

C) Thirty-eight protectors think they are admired by other people, and two think they are not. Twenty-five say they are admired by the young in their neighborhoods, while seven are admired by men in their areas and in other areas. Four are admired by some relatives, and two by some strong young men. Thirty protectors say they are admired, because people imitate the strong, the Qabaday, and want to be like them. Four say they are admired because others want an easy life like their's. One says he is admired because they think he is a hero. One says he is admired because he represents their dreams, and one other is admired because Zu'ama respect him.

b) Thirty protectors think they are envied by others, while 10 think they are not. Eleven protectors say they are envied by their friends as well as by their enemies. Seven say they are envied by neighbors and acquaintances. Five say they are envied by their opponents. Three say they are envied by some relatives, three others by some Qabadayat, one by those inferior to him, and one by ex-colleagues.

Six protectors say they are envied because they are better off than others. Eight others replied, because they are close to their Za'im and get good sums of money from him. Six say they are envied because they made it. Four say they are envied because they are known. Two are envied by those who want their jobs, and one says "they think I am a king."

c) Thirty-seven protectors feel they are feared by others, while two say they are not and one refused to answer. Thirteen protectors are feared by their opponents. Thirteen others are feared by people in their area and, in other areas. Nine are feared by people in their area. Five are feared by their enemies, as well as by their friends. One is feared by policemen.

Twenty-two protectors think they are feared because they are strong; nine because they are Qabadayat; and nine because they can beat their opponents, and because they are a threat to them. Three say they are feared because of their fame, and three others because they shoot and kill. Two say they are feared because they are protected.

D) Six lieutenants think they are admired by others while one thinks he is not. Four lieutenants say they are admired by many men in all areas of Beirut. Two lieutenants say they are admired by their men and acquaintances. Four lieutenants said they were admired because people like to imitate Zu'ama, would like to be in their position, and would like their way of life. Two lieutenants said they were admired because of their authority and personality.

b) Six lieutenants think they are envied, while one says he is not. The six lieutenants feel they are envied by many of their friends as well as of their enemies.

Two lieutenants say they are envied because they have many supporters and followers. Two others say they are envied because they have stronger wastah and connections than those who envy them. One lieutenant says he is envied because he makes lots of money, and another because he has "a lot that could be envied."

c) All lieutenants think they are feared by others. Six say they are feared by their friends and enemies, while one says he is feared by policemen, politicians and Qabadayat. Two lieutenants say others fear them because, "They know that death awaits the one who challenges me or stands against me." Three lieutenants say others fear them because they are strong. One lieutenant says "people by nature fear the strong."

We can infer, from the fact that most Qabadayat admired other

Qabadayat and Zu'ama while they were growing up, and that they are admired by young men in their area, that new members will join in the system as long as things do not change radically. The Qabadayat system has become a chain of succession: older ones retire, and new members join.

We can also infer from the findings about the relationship between the Qabadayat and their community, that the system as a whole will continue to be accepted by the community because of a combination of favors and fear, with favors, in my opinion, being the heavier factor in acceptance. None of the findings shows that the Qabadayat are enemies to their communities or outcasts in their communities, except for hangers-on.

Chapter Seven

Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter I am going to give a summary of our major findings, provide some conclusions in the form of empirical generalizations, and discuss the implications of this study for theories of crime and future research in developing countries.

A) Most of the Qabadayat who are organized or semi-organized by local politicians come from two main socio-economic groups: the lower socio-economic status people who have very limited means, and property owners who are well off and who seek power for its own sake. Both groups have relatively low educational levels: 75% have studied six years or less. None has a university education.

B) The social values of the Qabadayat cherish violence. They consider violence as a practical solution for their problems.

C) The Qabadayat live in neighborhoods with a high volume of violence. All of them have seen fights in the streets of their neighborhoods, and all of them have seen people in their community carry weapons.

D) All the Qabadayat have gotten into fights with other people while growing up, and some of them got into trouble with the police while growing up.

E) The Qabadayat carry on illegal activities for politicians and for themselves, with varying degrees of frequency.

F) Except for hangers-on, the Qabadayat are not social outcasts, nor enemies of the people. The reaction of the community to them is favorable: a mixture of admiration, fear, respect and in some cases envy. The Qabadayat are not stigmatized.

G) The Qabadayat system performs many functions for the community. It performs many vital services for most members of the community.

In respect to favors and services done to the community, a discussion of the harms done by that system is necessary. It is true that overall the community accepts the Qabadayat system because the benefits from the system, according to the community (based upon my experiences), exceed the disadvantages. That, of course, is my evaluation of the situation. I think that members of the community consider the Qabadayat system very helpful because they get immediate and tangible services through that system, i.e., a job, wastah and sometimes financial help. Although we did not ask the Qabadayat about the harm they do to the community, certain harmful things could be seen by someone who has lived in that community. The major disadvantage I see is that the Qabadayat system helps in perpetuating the present political order. The Qabadayat see to it that members of the community keep their loyalty to feudal politicians, and as such offset political awareness and resistance on the part of the masses. The masses are more like sheep than intelligent participants in the political process.

Another harmful aspect is that the Qabadayat are a tool of fear and persecution for those who are not loyal followers of their Zu'ama. Dissenting individuals or opponents are persecuted, and in many cases are destroyed either physically or psychologically, i.e., politically suppressed.

H) There is a definite and strong relationship between the Qabadayat and the politicians. The main features of the relationship are illegal services done by the Qabadayat for the politicians, in return for protection, wastah, and financial rewards from the politicians.

I) Most Qabadayat said that if they lose the protection of politicians they will look for other jobs, that is, they will change their way

of life.

J) Most Qabadayat stated that others will not be encouraged to follow their steps if the big men were different.

K) In general, the Qabadayat get away with their crimes, either totally or with a light sentence. Lieutenants have enough power to avoid imprisonment. Other groups of Qabadayat receive sentences that are not commensurate with the seriousness of their offenses.

L) The politicians have corrupted the police system, the judiciary system, the civil service and private enterprise.

M) Mediation by Zu'ama and other personalities between the aggressor and the victim, and the acceptance of the principle of compensation enable the Zu'ama to keep the state out of many conflicts. In addition, it lowers the volume of violence by eliminating revenge and retaliation, because the victim who accepts financial compensation withdraws his rights and promises not to retaliate.

Before moving into the generalizations one can make from the findings, I would like to comment on Merton's analysis of the functions of organized crime in Social Theory and Social Structure.

The first major function Merton mentioned was: it serves political integration in a system of decentralization of power. In the case of Lebanon the system of power is highly centralized. Organized crime, or the semi-organized Qabadayat system, serves the ruling elite and not political integration.

The second function he mentioned was: It provides personalized help to disadvantaged people in an impersonalized society. Here I disagree with Merton because in the case of Lebanon, as a result of the personalized society, disadvantaged people have to rely on organized crime. I think

that if Lebanese society was impersonal (an unlikely prospect), people would not have to depend on organized crime. The basic source of disagreement between the way I see organized crime and the way Merton sees it, is the composition of the population in each of Lebanon and the U.S. In Lebanon, the population is indigenous; there are no immigrants. The U.S.A., on the other hand, had a continuous inflow of new immigrants who need personalized help. In Lebanon, personalization of all channels leads to the dependence of the people on organized crime.

I agree with Merton's third mentioned function: It provides a mechanism for social mobility.

I also agree with the fourth function he mentioned: It allows various economic groups to achieve their various ends.

The empirical generalizations one can make on the basis of the findings are:

1) As long as there are institutionalized illegal channels some people, due to various contributing factors, will use them because they find them easier, faster or more convenient than legal channels.

2) Institutionalized corruption makes some people feel they have the right to share in it. This finding parallels, or confirms Sutherland's observation that white collar crime encourages crime by the lower classes. Instead of prestigious individuals setting and adhering to codes of moral conduct, they practice codes of immoral conduct which other classes emulate. The prestigious individuals in the case of Lebanon are the Zu'ama.

3) Protection against prosecution by legal authorities is vital to the survival of organized crime.

4) The Qabadayat system is tolerated by the community because it performs many services for most members of the community.

5) A society whose norms and values cherish violence is more conducive to the emergence of organized crime.

6) The political system is a major contributing factor for the emergence and perpetuation of organized crime.

7) Growing up in an area full of Qabadayat contributes to the adolescent's aspiration to become a Qabaday. We can generalize that one's aspirations are channelled by people in the neighborhood.

8) Joining the system or aspiring to join it is caused by two sets of factors--pushing and attracting. Pushing factors include things such as for example, approval of violence, manliness, love of power etc., and the individual's situation, i.e., being unemployed, broke, etc. Attracting factors include things such as opportunities for gaining power, protection, status in the community, easy money, lots of free time, and absence of stigmatization.

This study has implications for theories of crime, for developing countries and for further research.

1) Implication for Theories of Crime

Because of specific questions designed to examine various theoretical explanations of crime, the findings of this research show that "learning" crime or "learning" to be a criminal is one aspect of criminality that should be stressed. Association with criminals has some bearing on becoming a criminal, but it is very difficult to specify in which area the bearing is strongest, i.e., in aspirations, encouragement, etc. It is also very difficult to estimate the weight of association as a contributing factor to criminal behavior.

The theory was supported in two respects. First, it was found that all 72 respondents have associated with, or have friends who have violated

many laws and have gotten into all sorts of trouble. In addition the respondents admire their friends. Admiration is in fact an adoption of the definitions of those friends, which is favorable to the violation of the law. Second, it was found that the association of the youth, or the aspirants, with the Qabadayat in their areas has contributed to their initiation into the system. Initiation is not sudden. It is a long process which some respondents described by saying, "One has to go through the mill before he can become a Qabaday like me." Or as other respondents said, "Being a Qabaday needs years of struggle and experience."

Theory of Blocked Opportunity Structure--The findings of the study partially support Merton's theory of blocked opportunity structure. The support is partial because Merton's theory applies to some Qabadayat, and not to others. The Qabadayat to whom the theory applies are the poor, broke and unskilled, who desired wealth, an easy life, free time and power, and knew they could not get it through legitimate means, i.e., work; so they turned to illegitimate means. The theory does not apply, however, to those whose families were property owners and rich; yet they wanted to become Qabadayat. These people had access to the legitimate structure, but chose the illegitimate structure for other reasons, such as love of power, striving to be popular, and more self-satisfaction.

The findings also lend support to Shaw and MacKay's theory that crime is generated in certain areas and is passed from one generation to another within the same area. When asked about the events which led them to such a way of life, many of the Qabadayat mentioned the fact that they grew up in such areas. Also, the Qabadayat system historically has been confined and perpetuated in certain areas in Lebanese cities, namely the "popular areas." Those areas are sort of "the factory of Qabadayat."

As one respondent put it, "Our area produces the strongest Qabadayat."

The findings of the research do not support Becker's theory, or the notion of the labelling process which views the individual as very passive and particularly receptive to negative labels. Our respondents seem to reject, rather than accept and foster negative labeling of themselves by others. Out of 33 Qabadayat who were labeled bad and aggressive 26, or 78.7%, rejected the label and regarded themselves as good, while seven persons, or 21.3%, accepted the label and regarded themselves as others regarded them.

2) Since Lebanon is in a state of transition from a feudal to a modern society, the case of Lebanon has some implications for other developing countries, especially other Arab countries in the same stage of transition.

The first implication is that not every developing country has to pass through a stage of dominance of organized crime. This is evident from the absence of a system similar to the Qabadayat system in Egypt and Syria, which are in the same stage as Lebanon. As to why Egypt and Syria do not have a system of organized crime, there is no easy answer. One has to make a historical and social analysis of the countries concerned. However, some speculations may provide some of the reasons. Egypt and Syria had military revolutions which destroyed completely the power of the feudal families. Lebanon, on the other hand, had no revolution by the masses and it is evolving within the feudal structure.

The absence of feudal families, who can do many favors for their political clientele in Syria and Egypt, does not model or channel the aspirations of the people and their expectations to depend on such groups, nor are the people expected to help maintain the feudal families in power. Also, there are not so many interest groups in Egypt and Syria, as in

Lebanon, who do not trust the government, and who want their Za'im to mediate between them and the government. In Syria and Egypt the concept of the nation is fully developed, while Lebanon is still mainly composed of many sovereign groups within the state.

The implication for developing countries in general is to recognize that personalistic leaders and what they can do for the tribe or the family in terms of immediate and tangible services, will continue to be important as long as the feudal structure remains strong, and there are no effective governmental programs of social and political development administered by an efficient and honest bureaucracy.

3) Implications for Further Research

The major implication of this study for further cross-cultural research is for Western researchers to go into under-developed countries, or countries with different cultures and try to do descriptive research on criminal behavior in those countries. They also should expect a modification of theories that apply to Western societies. Only through intensive cross-cultural research and continuous modification of existing theories can we achieve a more thorough understanding of all forms of human behavior.

Many theorists have given significance to the fact that under-developed countries have a sub-culture of violence. The implication here is that the outcome of values which precipitate violence does not necessarily result in an organized system of crime, like the Qabadayat. The outcome of the sub-culture of violence depends upon the characteristics of other institutions in society, particularly the political institution, which affect the emergence of an institutionalized structure of illegitimate means.

Essentially this was a pilot study, and the topic warrants a more exhaustive treatment of the subject in Lebanon. My methods of research demonstrate the feasibility, as well as the desirability, of studying "legally-defined criminals" outside of penal institutions.

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